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ABSTRACT
This article seeks to identify the ways in which federal 
actions can influence state regulatory choices in the context of 
environmental policy.  The federal government may directly 
influence state policy choices by preempting state policies or by 
inducing state cooperation through the use of various incentives 
and penalties for state action.  The federal government may 
indirectly, and perhaps unintentionally, influence state policy 
choices as well.  Federal policies may encourage greater state 
regulation by reducing the costs of initiating regulatory action or 
by placing issues on state policy agendas.  Federal regulation may 
also discourage or even “crowd-out” state-level regulatory action 
by reducing the net benefits of state-level initiatives. The potential 
for federal regulation to have both positive and negative indirect 
effects on state regulatory choices suggests that increases in federal 
regulation can alternatively enhance or reduce state regulatory 
activity and may, in some instances, even result in a net reduction 
of regulatory protection for environmental resources.  Such 
potential effects are largely ignored in environmental policy 
discussions, and warrant subsequent empirical study.  While this 
paper focuses on environmental regulation, the overall framework 
should be applicable to other regulatory contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
Up until the 1970s, environmental protection largely 
consisted of a patchwork of state laws, local ordinances and 
common law nuisance protections.1 State and local governments 
had begun to adopt various environmental measures in the 1960s.  
Nonetheless, there was a general perception that state and local 
governments were unable or unwilling to address most 
environmental concerns.2 Congress responded with an array of 
environmental statutes that reoriented the federal-state relationship 
in environmental law.3 The federal government assumed the 
dominant role in national policy-making.  States continue their 
environmental protection efforts, but they are largely 
overshadowed by the federal government. 4
In recent years scholars have begun to reexamine the 
federal-state balance in environmental law.5 New scholarship has 
1 See Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and 
Contemporary Models, 54 MD. L. REV. 1141 (1995).  
2 See generally Jonathan H. Adler, The Fable of Federal Environmental 
Regulation: Reconsidering the Federal Role in Environmental Protection, 55 
CASE WEST. RES. L. REV. 93 (2004).
3
 These statutes include the Clean Air Act (1970), the Clean Water Act (1972), 
the Endangered Species Act (1973), the Safe Drinking Water Act (1974), the 
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (1975), the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (1976), and the Toxic Substances Control Act 
(1976).  The National Environmental Policy Act, enacted in 1969, was also an 
important environmental statute, but it did not have as much of an impact on the 
federal-state balance in environmental law.
4 See John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Federal Preemption: 
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 205 
(1997) (the role of states “is increasingly restricted to those areas not yet subject 
to extensive federal regulation . . . and to the implementation and enforcement of 
permits issued pursuant to federal standards and procedures”).
5 See, e.g., James L. Huffman, Making Environmental Regulation mOre 
Adaptive Through Decentralization: The Case for Subsidiarity, 52 U.KAN. L. 
REV. 1377 (2005); DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM 
WASHINGTON (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Letting Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using 
Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF 
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challenged the necessity and effectiveness of much federal 
environmental regulation, while others have defended the 
preeminent role of federal environmental law.  There remains 
substantial disagreement on the extent to which states can be 
trusted to adopt welfare-enhancing environmental safeguards.6
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 263-64 (Jim Chen ed., 2004); Bradley C. Karkkainen, 
Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 206 (2002); Wallace E. Oates, A Reconsideration of 
Environmental Federalism, in RECENT ADVANCES IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
ECONOMICS 22 (John A. List & Aart de Zeeuw eds., 2002); PIETRO S. NIVOLA & 
JON A. SHIELDS, MANAGING GREEN MANDATES: LOCAL RIGORS OF U.S. 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory 
Studies, 2001); Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of 
Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 258-59 
(2000); DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM: MAKING SENSIBLE 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD 179-83 (1999); Richard 
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Normative Critique, in 
THE NEW FEDERALISM: CAN THE STATES BE TRUSTED? 105 (John Ferejohn & 
Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1997); Richard L. Revesz, The Race to the Bottom and 
Federal Environmental Regulation: A Response to Critics, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
535, 536-37 (1997); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 
MICH. L. REV. 570 (1996); HENRY BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING 
FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY (1996); Percival, supra note 
1; Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the 
‘Race to the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992).  Even analysts that are highly skeptical of the 
benefits of granting states greater control over environmental policy decisions 
acknowledge that some measure of decentralization is warranted.  See, e.g., 
Esty; Rena I. Steinzor, EPA and Its Sisters at 30: Devolution, Revolution, or 
Reform?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 11086 (2001).
6
 For critiques of decentralization, see, e.g., Kirsten Engel and Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Environmental Federalism in the United States: The Risks of 
Devolution, in REGULATORY COMPETITION AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 137 (Daniel C. Esty & Damien Geradin eds., 
2001); Rena I. Steinzor, Devolution and the Public Health, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 351 (2000); Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is 
There a “Race” and Is It “to the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J.  271 (1997); Peter 
P. Swire, The Race to Laxity and the Race to Undesirability: Explaining 
Failures in Competition Among Jurisdictions in Environmental Law, 14 YALE J. 
ON REG. 67 (1996).
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Some scholars fear that states would adopt suboptimally lax 
environmental protections absent a sufficient federal regulatory 
“floor.”7  This concern exists even where environmental problems 
lack the sort of extraterritorial impacts that are likely to produce 
insufficient environmental protection at the state and local level.8
Despite the extensive scholarly literature assessing the 
proper role of federalism in environmental law, there has been 
relatively little analysis of why states adopt given environmental 
policies.9 There is even less consideration of how federal 
regulatory choices influence state environmental policy, and how a 
change in federal policy could influence states’ willingness to 
adopt more environmental protections of their own.  This article 
seeks to address this gap by describing some of the factors that are 
likely to influence state environmental policy decisions and 
delineating how federal environmental policies can affect state 
policy choices.  Specifically, this article seeks to further the 
understanding of how federal regulation influences the scope and 
effectiveness of state regulations.
7
 It is important to note that a suboptimal regulatory regime could either over-
regulate or under-regulate.  In the environmental literature, however, there is a 
greater concern that states will under-regulate absent active federal participation 
in environmental protection.
8
 For example, some commentators fear that interjurisdictional competition for 
economic investment will produce a “race to the bottom” that leads to 
systematic underprotection of environmental values.  See, e.g., CLIFFORD 
RECTHSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL 
ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22–25 (2003) (the race-
to-the-bottom theory is the “central underpinning” of federal environmental 
regulation); WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) 
(noting “a widespread belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a 
danger of a mutually destructive ‘race to the bottom.’”); Esty, supra note 5, at 
628 (“Fears of a welfare-reducing race to the bottom represent one of the central 
underpinnings of federal environmental regulation in the United States”); Swire, 
supra note 6; Engel, supra note 6. 
9 See PAUL TESKE, REGULATION IN THE STATES 8 (2004) (“state regulation is far 
less well understood than federal regulation, though it is no less important”).   In 
this regard, the Teske volume is an important addition to the literature.
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Some of the factors that influence state regulatory decisions
are readily apparent, such as wealth, knowledge and interest-group 
pressure.  The influences of federal regulation on state regulatory 
choices, particularly insofar as such influences are felt indirectly, 
may be less obvious.  Nonetheless, it should be evident that federal 
policy decisions should have some effect on state policy choices 
concerning the existence, scope, and contours of state regulatory 
programs.  These effects can occur whether intended or not.  In 
some instances, federal action may even preclude or discourage 
welfare-enhancing initiatives at the state and local level.  
This article suggests a framework for categorizing and 
analyzing how federal policy decisions can influence state 
regulatory choices.  The federal influence can be both “positive” –
resulting in greater levels of state regulation – or “negative.”   
Federal influence can also be direct or indirect. Direct influences 
include federal preemption and the creation of various incentives 
and penalties for state action or inaction, including conditional 
preemption and conditional spending.  Indirect influences may be 
less obvious, but are no less important.  Federal action – or perhaps 
even federal inaction – can encourage greater state regulation by 
reducing the costs of initiating regulatory action or by altering state 
policy agendas.  At the same time, federal regulation may 
discourage states from adopting or maintaining more protective 
environmental rules or even “crowd-out” state-level regulatory 
action by reducing the net benefits of state-level initiatives. 
Building on prior research and analysis of federalism in 
environmental law and policy,10 this article further seeks to 
10 See Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in Environmental Federalism, 
14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130 (2005); Jonathan H. Adler, Judicial Federalism and 
the Future of Federal Environmental Regulation, 90 IOWA L. REV. 377 (2005); 
Adler, supra note 2; Adler, supra note 5; Jonathan H. Adler, The Ducks Stop 
Here? The Environmental Challenge to Federalism, 9 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 
205, 226 (2001); Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of 
Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal 
Wetland Regulation, 29 ENV. L. 1 (1999); Jonathan H. Adler, Comment, The 
Green Aspects of Printz: The Revival of Federalism and Its Implications for 
Environmental Law, 6 GEO. MASON. L. REV. 573 (1998).
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reexamine some of the conventional assumptions that underpin 
many discussions of the proper federal-state balance in 
environmental policy.  Among other things, this article suggests 
that insufficient attention to the effects of federal action on state 
policy choices can reduce the scope and effectiveness of 
environmental protection efforts.  For example, if federal 
regulatory action has the potential to discourage or “crowd out” 
state regulatory efforts, the adoption of a federal regulatory “floor” 
may actually lower instead of raise the aggregate level of 
environmental protection in a given jurisdiction.11
Part I provides a brief overview of the development of 
environmental regulation at the state and local level and identifies 
some of the factors that influence state-level environmental 
regulatory decisions.  These factors help explain why governments 
at any level choose to adopt environmental regulations and why 
different states, left to their own devices, will adopt different 
environmental policies.  These factors vary over time as well.  A 
given state that is unlikely to adopt specific environmental 
measures at one point may be more likely to adopt the same, or 
even more extensive, measures at a later date.  This 
“environmental transition” provides the context for understanding 
how federal regulatory decisions can impact state regulatory 
decisions over time.  Identifying those economic and political 
factors which are likely to influence state policy choices is also 
necessary in order to isolate and evaluate the extent to which 
federal policies affect state decisions.
Part II provides an introductory matrix and brief overview 
of how federal regulatory decisions can directly influence state 
regulatory decisions.  This part explains that federal directives 
commanding state regulatory action are constitutionally prohibited, 
but federal prohibitions on state regulatory action are not.  Further, 
11 Cf. Paul S. Weiland, Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A 
Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 237, 242 (2000) (federal “minimum 
standard may raise the bar by establishing a baseline of protection” and 
“foreclose the possibility of a race to the bottom or race to laxity”); Steinzor 
supra note 6. 
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the federal government retains substantial power to induce state 
regulatory action through the provision of various penalties and 
incentives, including the conditional use of preemption and the use 
of conditional spending.  
Part III turns to the indirect effects of federal regulation on 
state regulatory choices.  This part explains how federal regulatory 
action may increase the amount of state-level environmental 
regulation, even in the absence of direct federal incentives.  
Federal action may alter the policy agenda at the state level by 
highlighting or otherwise increasing public awareness of 
environmental concerns at the state level.  It can also alter the 
interest group demand for state-level regulation or facilitate the 
adoption of state-level regulation by reducing the costs of enacting 
or implementing state regulatory initiatives.  In this sense, federal 
action can serve as a complement to state regulations.
Part III also contemplates the potential for federal 
regulations to have the opposite indirect effect.  Specifically, this 
section explains how federal regulatory action has the potential to 
discourage more protective state rules as well as to “crowd out” 
state regulatory efforts insofar as federal regulations serve as a 
substitute for state-level environmental protections.  This part 
describes those conditions under which federal regulation could 
result in less overall environmental regulation in a given state than 
had the federal government never regulated at all.  Specifically, 
where the federal government creates a regulatory floor before the 
adoption of state-level regulation, it becomes less likely that a 
given state will adopt regulations of its own in the future.  This can 
be true even if at a later date, due to a state’s own environmental 
transition, the amount of environmental regulation demanded in a 
state is greater than that provided by the federal government.  As a 
result, the adoption of a federal regulatory floor that increases 
aggregate levels of environmental protection in the short run may, 
in the long run, result in less environmental protection in a given 
state.  Insofar as one assumes that increased levels of 
environmental regulation will, on the margin, increase net welfare, 
non-preemptive federal environmental regulations could still 
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produce net welfare reductions over time.12  This could be true 
even if one assumes that a given federal regulation is, when viewed 
in isolation, cost-beneficial, as well as if one ignores potential 
qualitative differences between states and the federal government 
that may produce more optimal regulation at the state level.
In order to simplify the analysis, the bulk of this article 
discusses the effects of federal action on state policy choices in 
quantitative terms, such as whether federal action produces more 
or less of a given type of state regulation.  Part IV explains how 
this oversimplifies the analysis in two respects.  First, while it is 
common to suggest that more environmental regulation is better 
than less regulation, it is not always clear that greater levels of 
environmental regulation are always welfare enhancing.  The 
optimal level of environmental regulation in a given context may 
be greater than current levels, but it may also be less.  Second, 
environmental regulation can vary in both quantitative and 
qualitiative ways, and the latter variations among competing 
environmental policies may be more important to the attainment of 
optimal levels of environmental protection than any quantitative 
regulatory target.  Accounting for qualitative differences in 
environmental policy measures may unduly complicate the 
analysis, but they should not be ignored.
Demonstrating the theoretical possibility that federal 
regulation may “crowd out” state-level environmental protection, 
does not establish that such crowding out has, or will, occur in any 
specific regulatory context.  With this caveat in mind, Part V 
reconsiders the history of environmental protection at the state and 
federal level with a particular focus on wetland regulation.  The 
history of state and federal regulation in this area is consistent with 
12
 It should be noted that increases in the stringency of environmental regulation 
will not necessarily produce net increases in social welfare.  Insofar as the costs 
of increased environmental regulation, economic and otherwise, are greater than 
the benefits, increased regulation will reduce social welfare.  However, insofar 
as one assumes that existing environmental regulations are under-protective, the 
potential for federal regulations to discourage greater protection at the state level 
should be of some concern.  See also infra Part IV.
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the crowding out hypothesis and other aspects of this analysis.  It 
does not by itself, however, demonstrate that such crowding out 
has occurred.  Rather, it underscores the need for greater attention 
to the effect federal policy decisions have on state policy choices 
and also suggests the need for further empirical examination of this 
issue.13
I. THE DEMAND FOR ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
The demand for environmental regulation is not static. 
Instead it changes over time.  As a general matter, demand for 
environmental protection has increased along with increases in 
wealth and scientific knowledge.  It is also influenced by many 
other factors that may fluctuate over time and from place to place.  
As Professor Farber summarized, “the passage of environmental 
laws is attributable to strong public demand, coupled with 
exploitation of that demand by ideological and credit-seeking 
politicians.”14  The relevant question is what determines the level 
of public demand for environmental protection, as well as the 
strength and involvement of other policy actors.  Understanding 
the factors that influence the demand for environmental is 
necessary to analyze the effect federal regulations may have on 
state regulatory choices.
A. The Environmental Transition
There was not always a significant demand for 
environmental regulation.  While this nation has a long and proud 
conservation history, dating back at least until the creation of 
hunting-oriented conservation groups in the late 1800s, many of 
13
 Identifying and quantifying the extent of any such crowding out and other 
indirect effects of non-preemptive federal regulation on state regulatory 
activities in the environmental and other regulatory contexts is a subject for 
subsequent empirical investigation, and lies beyond the scope of this paper.
14
 Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 59, 61 (1992).
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the environmental matters subject to regulation today were not 
seen as significant public concerns.  Even as various environmental 
problems began to emerge, they were not initially seen as 
significant policy concerns.  Some environmental problems were 
regarded as the inevitable, if not wholly desirable, consequence of 
economic progress and industrial growth.15  In other cases, society 
was simply unaware of the magnitude of certain environmental 
harms.  In still other instances, official policy sought to encourage 
environmental modifications and land-use changes that current 
policy now seeks to reverse.16
The state of environmental knowledge was relatively poor.  
Environmental resources were devalued, and some environmental 
offenses were even believed to be positive goods.  Wetlands were 
viewed as breeding grounds for mosquitoes that spread disease; the 
important ecological functions wetlands provide were 
underappreciated, if even understood at all.17  Predators and pest 
species were targets for extermination, with little consideration of 
the role various species play in health ecosystems.18 In the 19580s, 
government agencies sprayed DDT and other pesticides 
indiscriminately, even over the objections of local landowners, 
with little cognizance of the potential consequences for non-target 
15 See, e.g., WILLIAM DONAHUE ELLIS, THE CUYAHOGA 157 (1966) (noting that 
some viewed the prismatic colors of pollution on the Cuyahoga River as “the 
sweetest colors a river ever had”).  External factors also effected the level of 
concern about waste management and other environmental practices.  See, e.g., 
CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL: 
MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE EPA139-41 (1996) (wartime 
imperatives reduced concern for industrial waste management during World 
War II).
16
 For examples of how federal policy has encouraged environmental harm, see 
generally GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT (Donald R. Leal & Roger E. 
Meiners eds. 2002).
17 See David E. Gerard, Federal Flood Policies: 150 Years of Environmental 
Mischief, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT supra note 16, at 59–77; PAUL 
SCODARI, MEASURING THE BENEFITS OF FEDERAL WETLANDS PROGRAMS 16 
(1997).
18 See J. Bishop Grewell, War on Wildlife, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT, 
supra note 16, at 97-121.
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species.19  At one time, many thought smoke and coal dust had 
“antiseptic” qualities and could stem the spread of tuberculosis.20
In the first part of the Twentieth Century, environmental protection
as it is understood today was not a prominent public concern, 
particularly in comparison to economic development, 
technological progress, and addressing other social ills.  Insofar as 
environmental protection registered on the public agenda, it was 
focused on sanitation and drinking water, not recreational or 
aesthetic values.
As the nation awakened to environmental concerns, 
regulations and other protective measures were put in place.  State 
by state, city by city, the nation began to go through what can be 
termed an “environmental transition.”21  Places that once placed 
little value on environmental protection now sought the adoption 
of stringent regulatory measures.  Increased environmental 
concern, combined with other factors, led to the adoption of a new 
generation of local, state, and eventually federal environmental 
controls.  The first regulatory measures were local ordinances 
designed to control smoke22 – one of the first modern 
environmental problems to be recognized as such.  Later measures 
addressed other air pollution concerns, water pollution, and 
eventually other environmental problems.23
This increase in demand for environmental protection can 
best be understood as resulting from an “environmental transition,” 
during which a given community or jurisdiction develops a 
demand for a given type of environmental protection.  This 
19 See Roger E. Meiners & Andrew P. Morriss, Silent Springs and Silent 
Villages: Pesticides and the Trampling of Property Rights, in GOVERNMENT VS. 
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 16,, at 15-37.
20 INDUR M. GOKLANY, CLEARING THE AIR: THE REAL STORY OF THE WAR ON 
AIR POLLUTION 11 (1999).
21 GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 5, 87-109.
22 See Arthur C. Stern, History of Air Pollution Legislation in the United States, 
32 J. AIR POLLUTION CONTROL ASS’N 44, 44 (1982).
23 See Adler, supra note 2, at 98-100; Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and 
Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 
577 (2001).
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transition is driven, in large part, by increases in economic well-
being.  As higher-order priorities are addressed, and quality of life 
improves, societies begin to devote more resources to previously 
neglected concerns.  As populations become wealthier, both their 
willingness and ability to pay for environmental protection 
increase dramatically.24 At the same time, increases in 
development tend to coincide with increases in technological 
capabilities and the accumulation of scientific and other knowledge 
which may reveal heretofore unknown aspects of environmental 
problems, further heightening the desire for change.25  It is also 
likely that the increase in development itself, insofar as it results in 
increased pollution and other environmental harms, further serves 
to increase the priority of environmental protection.  A given level 
of pollution initially may be viewed as an acceptable trade-off for 
increased prosperity and industrialization.  Yet over time, as 
prosperity and pollution both increase, priorities change eventually 
leading to a reduction in pollution levels.  The theory of an 
environmental transition can explain the Environmental Kuznets 
Curve documented in an extensive economic literature, in which 
pollution levels initially increase but then eventually decline as 
societal wealth increases over time.26
24 GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 5 (“the wealthier the society, the more it can 
afford to research, develop, and install the technologies necessary for a cleaner 
environment.”).
25 GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 89.
26 See Bruce Yandle, Maya Vijayaraghavan & Madhusudan Bhattarai, The 
Environmental Kuznets Curve: A Primer, PERC RESEARCH STUDY 02-01 (May 
2002); see also Richard L. Stroup, ECO-NOMICS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD 
KNOW ABOUT ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 13-14 (2003) (summarizing 
research finding that willingness-to-pay for environmental protection increases 
with income); Jason Scott Johnston, On the Market for Ecosystem Control, 21 
VA. ENVTL. L.J. 129, 146 (2002) (“There is abundant evidence that the demand 
for outdoor recreation and environmental amenities increases with national 
income.”); Richard L. Stroup & Roger E. Meiners, Introduction: The Toxic 
Liability Problem: Why Is It Too Large?, in CUTTING GREEN TAPE: TOXIC 
POLLUTANTS, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION AND THE LAW 15 (Richard L. 
Stroup & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2000) (“Willingness to pay for environmental 
measures . . . is highly elastic with respect to income.”); Kenneth E. McConnell, 
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For any given environmental problem, the environmental 
transition begins with a “period of perception” – a period “during 
which a substance . . . gains sufficient notoriety to be perceived as 
a . . . pollutant by the public and, perhaps more importantly, by 
policymakers.”27  Unless a given environmental problem is 
recognized as such, there is no reason to expect any institution, 
public or private, to do much about it.  This period of perception is 
itself facilitated by both changes in social priorities as well 
increases in scientific and technical knowledge.  While societal 
affluence and technological capacity are almost certainly 
interdependent, they both seem to be important elements of the 
environmental transition.28  In most cases, however, the period of 
perception will precede the adoption of policies to address a given 
environmental concern.  For many environmental problems, the 
period of perception began in states and local communities before 
it occurred at the federal level.  As a result, many state and local 
governments adopted relevant environmental measures before the 
federal government.
The concept of the environmental transition is important in 
evaluating state regulatory policy as the transition occurs for 
different environmental problems at different places and at 
different times.  Certain states will go through a period of 
perception for particular concerns at different times, due to a wide 
range of factors, some of which are discussed below.  When a state 
goes through the environmental transition for a particular concern 
is important for evaluating the influence of federal policy on state 
Income and the Demand for Environmental Quality, 2 ENVTL. & DEV. ECON. 
383, 385-86 (1997) (reporting on empirical evidence of an environmental 
Kuznets curve); Matthew E. Kahn & John G. Matsusaka, Demand for 
Environmental Goods:  Evidence from Voting Patterns on California Initiatives, 
40 J.L. & ECON. 137 (1997) (noting that most environmental goods are normal 
goods for which demand rises with income); Patrick Low, Trade and the 
Environment:  What Worries the Developing Countries?, 23 ENTVL. L. 705, 706 
(1993) (noting that “the demand for improved environmental quality tends to 
rise with income.”).
27 GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 3.
28 See GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 89.
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regulatory choices.  Where a state’s environmental transition 
precedes federal regulation, the effect of federal action on state 
policy choices may well be different than when a state goes 
through the transition after federal regulations are already in 
place.29
B. Determinants of State Regulation
The rate at which different states adopted environmental 
protections varied greatly.  Some went through their environmental 
transitions with regard to particular environmental concerns well 
before others.  Some of this pattern of state and local activity may 
be explained by the increase in economic prosperity, and a 
resulting increase in the demand for environmental protection.  As 
already noted, it is generally accepted that as people become 
wealthier, their willingness to pay for environmental protection 
increases, resulting in an eventual decline in at least some
measures of pollution.30  Yet wealth and per capita income are not 
sufficient in themselves to explain the patterns of state regulation.  
The variation in state environmental priorities is greater than 
differences in economic factors alone would indicate.  Numerous 
other factors also play a role.
As a state’s population grows, many environmental impacts 
will increase.  The pressure to develop previously undeveloped 
land will rise; there will be more vehicles on the road; demand for 
energy production will increase, and so on.  Therefore, population 
growth (and other measures of development) could well correlate 
with a demand for increased environmental protection.31  The 
29
 In addition, as discussed infra Part III, the adoption of federal regulations may 
themselves influence when a state goes through the environmental transition for 
a given environmental concern.
30 See infra notes ___ and accompanying text.
31
 This increase in the demand for environmental protection should also be 
driven, in part, by the increased marginal value of undeveloped land or resources 
as the supply dwindles.  For example, holding all else equal, the marginal value 
of each acre of undeveloped land in a sparsely populated and largely 
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amount of land available for development or environmental 
preservation should have a significant impact on the demand for at 
least some sorts of environmental protection.
The economic and ecological benefits provided by various 
environmental resources – “the wealth of nature” – could also 
contribute to the demand for environmental protection, whether or 
not they are priced and incorporated into economic markets.  
Wetlands, for example, provide many ecosystem functions, 
including water filtration, species habitat, and flood control.32
Insofar as these services have value in a state’s economy, the state 
government should be more likely to protect wetlands so as to 
maintain that value.  Thus, for example, there may be greater 
support for coastal protections in a state with industries that rely 
upon coastal resources, such as fishing or tourism.33  In a similar 
fashion, states that receive substantial revenue from hunting and 
fishing licenses, bird-watching, and the sale of outdoor recreation-
related goods and services may support greater land and habitat 
conservation measures, at least insofar as the benefits of such 
measures can be captured within the state.
In one sense, efforts to protect a state’s “wealth of nature” 
will be due to local knowledge about the benefits of local 
environmental amenities.  Environmental knowledge, like 
economic knowledge, is decentralized.34  Specific knowledge 
undeveloped state should be less than the value of an acre in a highly developed 
state.
32 See generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, WETLANDS: THEIR USE AND 
REGULATION 37-60 (1984).
33
 Likewise, a state in which coastal tourism industries predominate is likely to 
have different priorities within the realm of coastal protection than a state in 
which fishing or other coastal-related industries are more dominant.
34 See, e.g., John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 
MD. L. REV. 1183, 1218 (1995) (noting that “the knowledge necessary to 
administer any air pollution control program . . . can be found only at the local 
level.”).  This observation is based on the insights of Nobel Laureate economist 
F.A. Hayek, who observed “[t]he knowledge of the circumstances of which we 
must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the 
dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all 
the separate individuals possess.” F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in 
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about local ecological conditions – threats, problems, and solutions 
– is more likely to be found at the local level than in a centralized 
regulatory bureaucracy.35  Due to the decentralized nature of 
knowledge, one might expect that environmental protections would 
be adopted first in those areas where local knowledge about the 
need for such protection is the greatest.  A state in which there is 
substantial knowledge about the ecological benefits of wetlands –
and the costs and extent of wetland losses – may be more likely to 
regulate than a state in which such knowledge is relatively lacking.  
This knowledge could be measured by economic data that measure 
the value of wetlands to a state’s economy.  
Even apart from wealth and economic effects, 
environmental causes are clearly more popular in some states than 
in others.  For whatever reason, the political culture of some states 
is more hospitable to the adoption of environmental regulations 
than others.  While this may correlate with other variables, such as 
income, wealth, education, and the like, there is evidence that state 
environmental policies are in part a function of the environmental 
attitudes of state citizens.36
State environmental policy preferences can be measured in 
various ways.  For instance, the League of Conservation Voters, a 
prominent national environmental organization, publishes an 
annual vote rating for members of the U.S. Senate and the U.S. 
House of Representatives.  LCV ratings appear to correlate with 
Society, 35 AMER. ECON. REV. 519, 519-20 (1945).  For more on the 
“knowledge problem” in environmental policy, see Jonathan H. Adler, Letting 
Fifty Flowers Bloom: Using Federalism to Spur Environmental Innovation, in 
THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: CHANGE AND THE 
PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 265-66 (Jim Chen ed., 2004).
35 HENRY N. BUTLER & JONATHAN R. MACEY, USING FEDERALISM TO IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 27 (1996) (“Federal regulators never have been and 
never will be able to acquire and assimilate the enormous amount of information 
necessary to make optimal regulatory judgments that reflect the technical 
requirements of particular locations and pollution sources.”).
36 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 169 (citing Matthew Potosky, Clean Air 
Federalism: Do States Race to the Bottom?, 61 PUBLIC ADMIN. REV. 335 
(2001)).
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political preference for environmental regulatory policies.37 These 
ratings vary from state to state, and do not appear to be explained 
solely by economic factors.38  Another measure of support for state 
support for environmental measures more generally could be 
membership or contributions to state-level environmental 
organizations.39
There are several other independent political variables that 
could influence the likelihood that a given state will adopt 
measures to protect wetlands.  Some state governments may be 
more “activist” or “professional” than others.  It is possible that 
states with larger state governments, measured by budget or 
personnel, would be more likely to adopt environmental 
regulations than states with smaller, less active governments.  
37 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 191.
38 See Richard J. Lazarus, A Different Kind of “Republican Moment” in 
Environmental Law, in THE JURISDYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: 
CHANGE AND THE PRAGMATIC VOICE IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW  369, 374-380 
(Jim Chen ed., 2003). There are some potential problems with the use of LCV 
vote ratings to measure the environmental nature of a given state’s politics.  
First, some would argue that the LCV vote ratings are politicized, if not 
somewhat partisan.  In this critique, the LCV vote ratings do not measure 
whether a given politician is “pro-environment” so much as whether he or she 
votes in line with Washington, D.C.-based environmental organizations and that 
such organizations have  institutional or political interests which may conflict 
with some environmental goals.
Insofar as such groups do not maintain a monopoly on what policy 
positions are “pro-environment,” a politician could receive a lower vote rating 
despite his or her attentiveness to environmental concerns.  At the same time, 
because environmental issues may differ at the state and federal level, a “pro-
environment” vote rating in Congress may not correlate with attentiveness to 
environmental concerns in a given state.   It may be that in a given state, 
environmental issues addressed by state and local governments are more 
important to voters than environmental issues typically addressed by the federal 
government, or vice versa.  It is not altogether clear that state concern for local 
environmental problems would necessarily translate into support for politicians 
that are supportive of measures to address national, or even international, 
environmental problems.  Nonetheless, LCV ratings are almost certainly 
measuring a factor that influences state regulatory choices, even if only the 
political influence of mainstream environmental interest groups.
39 See TESKE, supra note 9 at 186.
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Among other things, this could reflect the political culture of the 
state, as some states will be more receptive to government 
regulation of any sort than others.  In the political science 
literature, measures of the “professionalism” of state government 
often correlate with the willingness to adopt regulatory measures.40
Some states may also be more ideologically predisposed to support 
the creation of regulatory programs.  Therefore which party 
controls the statehouse or various policy positions could also affect 
state regulatory policy choices.41
State regulatory choices are also influenced by the actions 
of other states.  The “race to the bottom” theory posits that states 
will be discouraged from adopting the optimal level of 
environmental protections due to interjurisdictional competition 
with other states.42  The theory is that states seeking to encourage 
economic investment and industrial development will be locked 
into a “race” to lower existing environmental standards (or fail to 
adopt optimal measures) in an effort to attract investment, and that 
any resulting economic gains will fail to offset the welfare losses 
from suboptimally lax environmental regulations.43 Though 
possible, empirical evidence demonstrating a race to the bottom in 
40 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 187-88; Chris Mooney, Measuring U.S. State 
Legislative Professionalism: An evaluation of Five Indices, 26 STATE & LOCAL 
GOV’T REV. 70 (1994).
41 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 181-82 (finding correlation between party control 
of legislature and state regulatory activity).
42 See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice?: Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196, 1212 (1977); see also CLIFFORD RECTHSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. 
MARKELL, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE 
STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 22–25 (2003) (the race-to-the-bottom theory is 
the “central underpinning” of federal environmental regulation); WILLIAM A. 
FISCHEL, THE HOME VOTER HYPOTHESIS 162 (2001) (noting “a widespread 
belief that competition among jurisdictions poses a danger of a mutually 
destructive ‘race to the bottom.’”).  
43 See id; see also Engel supra note 6; Swire supra note 6; Esty, supra note 5, at 
628.
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environmental policy is generally lacking.44 There is evidence that 
state policy makers consider the impact of environmental 
regulations on their states’ economic competitiveness.45
Nonetheless, most empirical studies have failed to find any 
evidence that such pressures result in a systematic lowering of 
state-level environmental measures.46
Whether or not there is a “race to the bottom” in 
environmental policy, the existence of interjurisdictional spillovers 
may discourage states from adopting some environmental 
protections.47   Where states are able to extraterritorialize the 
environmental effects of their own industrial growth, they will be 
less likely to adopt environmental controls.  An upwind state may 
adopt air pollution control measures to protect its own citizens –
who vote and pay taxes within the state – but is highly unlikely to 
adopt environmental measures designed to protect citizens of 
downwind jurisdictions.  At the same time, the downwind 
jurisdiction may be less likely to adopt environmental measures if 
such measures will be relatively unable to control environmental 
problems that are largely due to activities in upwind jurisdictions.
States can also be encouraged to adopt greater levels of 
environmental protection by the actions of their neighbors.  Insofar 
as one state is successful at addressing a given environmental 
problem in a cost-effective manner, other states become more 
44 See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Rationale for Federal Environmental 
Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992); see also Adler, Jurisdictional 
Mismatch, supra note 10, at 151-154.
45
 Engel, supra note 6. 
46
 Several economic studies have failed to find empirical evidence of any race to 
the bottom in environmental policy.  See, e.g., Daniel L. Millimet & John A. 
List, A Natural Experiment on the ‘Race to the Bottom’ Hypothesis: Testing for 
Stochastic Dominance in Temporal Pollution Trends, 65 OXFORD BULL. OF 
ECON. & STAT. 395 (2003); Daniel L. Millimet, Assessing the Empirical Impact 
of Environmental Federalism, 43 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 711 (2003); John A. List 
& Shelby Gerking, Regulatory Federalism and Environmental Protection in the 
United States, 40 J. OF REGIONAL SCI. 453 (2000); see also Oates, supra note 5, 
at 11-17.
47 See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10.
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likely to follow suit as they learn from competing jurisdictions.  
This hypothesis has some empirical support in studies showing that 
state decisions to adopt specific regulatory measures are influenced 
by the decision of neighboring jurisdictions to adopt similar 
measures.48 These studies find stronger evidence for this positive 
“contagion” effect than for a negative “race to the bottom.”49
Just as state policy makers can be influenced by policy 
decisions and environmental conditions in other states, state policy 
makers can be influenced by the federal government.  Federal 
regulatory decisions undoubtedly affect state environmental policy 
choices.  At the extreme, some commentators suggest that state 
regulatory choices are heavily influenced, if not effectively 
dictated by, federal policy.50 Well short of this extreme, it is 
possible that the federal government still exercises a substantial 
influence on state regulatory decision-making, intentionally or not.  
Whereas some federal policies directly seek to influence or 
preclude certain state policies, others may influence the relative 
costs and benefits of state policies, thereby encouraging or 
discouraging state regulatory action.  Unlike many of the other 
factors driving environmental policy decisions at the state level, 
these effects have been relatively unexplored.
II. DIRECT FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY CHOICES
48 See Oates, supra note 5, at 15 (“States appear to be ‘pulled’ to higher levels of 
abatement spending by more stringent measures in neighboring states, but 
relatively lax regulations nearby appear to have no effect on such 
expenditures”); TESKE, supra note 9, at 180-81 (finding states are more likely to 
increase, rather than decrease, air quality regulation in response to actions taken 
in neighboring states, and concluding that “the race to the bottom is not a factor 
here”); id. at 191-92 (finding same pattern in groundwater regulation). 
49 Id.
50 See, e.g., John P. Dwyer, The Role of State Law in an Era of Preemption: 
Lessons from Environmental Regulation, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 203, 203 
(1997)( “For the most part, states are not genuinely autonomous regulators; they 
exercise regulatory authority only by congressional grace.”).
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Federal policy decisions can have both direct and indirect 
effects on state regulatory choices.  Their effects may also be either
positive or negative, both in terms of the quantity and quality of 
state regulation.  The potential of both positive and negative effects 
weakens a common presumption that federal environmental 
measures will be welfare-enhancing.  It is possible that in some 
states the aggregate level of environmental protection could be 
lower than it would otherwise be due to the existence of federal 
regulations that discourage state environmental protection 
measures.
The most direct way for the federal government to 
influence state environmental policy decisions would be to dictate 
state policies from Washington, D.C.  While this approach was 
considered by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,51 and 
mulled over by academics,52 it is clearly unconstitutional under 
current Supreme Court precedent.  State governments remain 
“sovereign” under the doctrine of “dual sovereignty,”53 and 
therefore cannot be commandeered by the federal government.  
Whether to ensure sufficient disposal capacity for low-level 
radioactive waste54 or remedy lead contamination in drinking 
water,55 the federal government cannot require state governments 
to adopt desired policy measures.  Articulated by the Supreme 
51 See, e.g., Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827 (9th Cir. 1975), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 
(1977); Maryland v. EPA, 530 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA 
v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971 
(D.C. Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom. EPA v. Brown, 431 U.S. 99 (1977).  This 
litigation is summarized in Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 423.
52 See, e.g., Richard Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE 
L.J. 1196 (1976-77).
53
 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991).
54
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992)(holding portions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments unconstitutionally 
commandeer state governments). 
55
 Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) v. 
Edwards, 81 F.3d 1387 (5th Cir. 1996)(invalidating portions of the Lead 
Contamination Control Act).
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Court in clear and unequivocal terms, this anti-commandeering 
principle admits no exceptions.56
Despite the prohibition on federal commandeering of state 
governments, the federal government retains substantial ability to 
influence state policy-making.  The powers enumerated in Article I 
of the Constitution provide abundant means of encouraging state 
and local governments to act in accordance with federal 
preferences.  If the federal government seeks to prevent states from 
regulating in a given field, it may preclude states from acting.  
Such preemption should, in principle, be authorized by Congress, 
though federal agency actions can also have preclusive effect.  
Under the Supremacy Clause, the federal government has the 
largely unchallenged authority to preempt contrary state laws 
through the exercise of Congress’s enumerated powers.  
Preemption is used to reduce the amount of state regulatory 
activity.57
56 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 935 (“no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or 
benefits is necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty”). There is language in Printz that 
suggests purely ministerial requirements might be exempt from the anti-
commandeering rule, but the federal courts have not, as yet, found an attempted 
commandeering that was sufficiently immaterial to warrant an exception.  This 
may be due, in part, to the fact that relatively few statutes, environmental or 
otherwise, commandeer state governments.  There are a few such statutes in the 
environmental context, but these statutes have never been challenged in court.  
As these statutes impose minimal requirements on state governments, and the 
relevant programs are already in place, it is unlikely that these statutes will be 
challenged in the future.  See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 423 -
430.
Where federal courts have excused commandeering of state agencies in 
the environmental context, it has been by denying that commandeering is taking 
place.  The court’s order in Strahan v. Coxe arguably commandeered state 
officials under the federal Endangered Species Act, yet the First Circuit denied 
this was the case.  See Strahan v. Coxe, 127 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1997); Adler, 
Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 429-30
57
 “Regulatory activity” here should be understood to include legislation and 
agency regulations, as well as judicial decrees that have a forward-looking 
regulatory effect, including tort judgments that create de facto standards for 
product safety or professional conduct.
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If the federal government seeks to encourage greater 
regulatory activity by state governments, it may offer various 
inducements.  These inducements may be positive (carrots) or 
negative (sticks).  The most straightforward way to encourage state 
activity is to offer financial support for state programs that meet 
federal requirements or to otherwise confer benefits on compliant 
state governments.  In some cases more punitive measures may be 
required, such as the threat to preempt regulatory activity by 
noncompliant states or reduce funding from unrelated programs.  
In practice, the federal government often resorts to some 
combination of these measures to encourage the desired level of 
state regulation.  The ways in which federal policy may influence 
state regulatory decisions directly are illustrated in Figure 1a and 
discussed in greater detail below.
Figure 1a
Federal Influence on State Regulatory Activity
Direct Indirect
More State 
Regulation
(“positive”)
Commandeering
Inducement
Less State 
Regulation
(“negative”)
Preemption
A. Preemption
Where Congress adopts a law pursuant to its enumerated 
powers, it preempts conflicting state laws.  Federal preemption 
comes in two forms, express and implied.  Express preemption is 
straightforward.  Where Congress, or a federal agency, explicitly 
preempts state laws on a given subject, states are barred from 
adopting and enforcing their own regulations.58 Yet Congress need 
58 See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & 
Development Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) (“It is well established that within 
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not be so explicit for courts to find preemption.  Preemption may 
be implied either “where the scheme of federal regulation is so 
persuasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left 
no room for the states to supplement it,”59 so-called “field 
preemption,” or where state and federal law conflict or compliance 
with state law would obstruct, if not preclude, compliance with 
federal law, so-called “conflict preemption.”60
Although courts may find federal preemption where 
Congress has not made its intent to preempt state law explicit, such 
judgments are not to be made lightly.61  Generally, there is a 
presumption against finding preemption.62  Explicit statutory 
language easily overcomes this presumption, as does a clear 
conflict between state and federal law.  If federal law is supreme, it 
will not yield to conflicting state enactments.  In other cases, the 
presumption will be overcome where there are indicia of 
Congressional intent suggesting that the federal government did 
not intend to allow state interference in a given area or field.  In 
such cases, and when preemption is inferred from federal agency 
Constitutional limits Congress may preempt state authority by so stating in 
express terms.”).
59
 Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992).
60 Id.
61 See Richard H. Fallon, The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist court’s 
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429 (2002); Michael S. Greve & 
Jonathan Klick, Preemption in the Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Empirical 
Assessment, __ SUP. CT. ECON. REV. __ (forthcoming).
62 See Wisc. Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605 (1991) (“When 
considering preemption, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police 
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that 
was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).  Although this is the stated 
presumption, it is not clear how powerfully this presumption is applied in 
practice.  See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA, L. REV. 225 (2000); Thomas 
W. Merrill, Preemption in Environmental Law: Formalism, Federalism Theory, 
and Default Rules, available at http://federalismproject.org/-
preemption/papers/Merrill_Preemption_in_Environmental_Law.pdf.
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action, Congressional intent is “the ultimate touchstone” of 
preemption analysis.63
Preemption operates to prevent state regulatory activity.  
The net effect of federal preemption is for there to be less 
regulation than there would have been otherwise.64  Federal laws 
precluding state regulation of automobile or oil tanker design mean 
that manufacturers need only comply with one regulatory standard.  
Federal regulations in such cases serve as a regulatory “floor” and 
a regulatory “ceiling” at the same time.  In other cases, preemption 
may serve to ensure that there is no regulation of a given type or 
governing particular subject matter, as where federal law precludes 
states from adopting particular rules, but the federal government
does not adopt rules of its own.65  Where implied preemption is 
found, this will typically preclude any state or local regulation 
whatsoever.66  Where Congress explicitly preempts state 
regulation, however, the scope of the preemption usually will be 
limited to the extent provided for in the statutory text.
63
 Medtronic v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996); see also CSX Transp. V. 
Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993) (courts should “focus on the plain 
wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ 
preemptive intent”).
64
 In some cases the purpose of federal preemption is to replace one type of 
regulation with another.  This still results in less regulation than if the federal 
regulation was adopted in addition to the state regulation.  The effects of 
preemption across states may not be uniform, however.  A federal statute that 
imposes a federal standard when only a handful of states have regulated will 
increase regulation in some jurisdictions at the same time that it reduces 
regulation by preempting preexisting rules elsewhere.
65
 The most obvious example, albeit a case of constitutional rather than statutory 
preemption, occurs under the “dormant commerce clause.”  States are precluded 
from adopting measures that discriminate against out-of-state trade not because 
it is assumed that such regulations will be adopted by Congress.  Rather, there is 
a constitutional presumption against the adoption of such rules by any level of 
government, though Congress does retain the authority to adopt laws limiting 
the flow of interstate commerce or even delegating authority to the states to 
adopt such measures themselves.  This division of authority “creates obstacles to 
states’ enacting laws that are more protective of the environment.” RICHARD J. 
LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 38 (2004).
66 See Weiland, supra note 11, at 258 -59.
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Given that preemption operates to reduce aggregate 
regulatory burdens,67 it should be no surprise that federal 
preemption of state environmental regulatory standards is often 
sought by business interests seeking to establish regulatory 
uniformity, a “ceiling” on regulatory stringency, or both.68  Federal 
preemption of state automotive emission regulations, for example, 
resulted from lobbying by U.S. automakers fearing the potential 
for different emissions standards to be adopted in different states –
and believing that federal standards would be less stringent than 
those developed in the states.69  This is not to say that there are not 
sometimes economic justifications for preempting variable state 
standards with a single federal standard, only to note that this 
pressure for federalization often comes from industry rather than 
from environmentalist interests.
The mere adoption of a federal regulatory standard that 
operates as a regulatory “floor” does not necessarily preempt state 
regulation as a legal matter (though it may well have that practical 
effect).  For example, a federal regulation imposing emission 
limitations on an industrial facility will not necessarily preempt a 
less stringent or differently structured state regulation governing 
emissions from the same facility.  As a practical matter, regulated 
facilities will focus on compliance with the more stringent federal 
67 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 15 (noting federal preemption has often been 
“designed to facilitate greater total deregulation” (emphasis in original)).
68 See Weiland, supra note 11, at 242 (“By creating a ceiling, environmental 
laws may allow the private sector to operate within a predictable and uniform 
environment”).  Similar arguments have been used to support federal 
preemption of state regulations and tort suits in other areas as well.  See, e.g., 
Caroline E. Mayer, Rules Would Limit Lawsuits, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2006 at 
D01 (preemption by Consumer Product Safey Commission); Gary Young, FDA 
Strategy Would Preempt Tort Suits, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 1, 2004 (preemption by 
food & Drug Administration).
69 See E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The 
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313 (1985).  For 
other examples of this phenomenon, see ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC 
COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith, Jr. eds. 1992); 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENTALISM: GOING BEHIND THE GREEN CURTAIN (Terry L. 
Anderson, ed. 2000).
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standard and may ignore the duplicative state requirement (or vice-
versa).  Nonetheless, the existence of the federal standard would 
not necessarily absolve the regulated facility from simultaneous 
compliance with the state’s regulation, particularly insofar as the 
state regulation imposes independent reporting or enforcement 
provisions or uses an alternative means of determining 
compliance.70  There is no conflict as it is possible to comply with 
both rules; by meeting the more stringent regulation a facility 
would also comply with the less stringent regulation.  If permits 
are required from both federal and state agencies for facility 
operation, then both permits are required even if compliance with 
one should make compliance with the other a foregone conclusion, 
unless the less stringent standards are explicitly or otherwise 
preempted by the federal regulation.71
Preemption is common in environmental law, particularly 
concerning the regulation of products that are manufactured for 
sale in interstate commerce.72  For example, section 209(b) of the 
Clean Air Act prohibits states from adopting “any standard relating 
to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles.”73 The 
Energy Policy Conservation Act preempts any state regulation of 
70
 Levels of stringency are not the only way in which federal and state standards 
could differ.  For example, it would be possible for the federal government to 
impose a technology standard on a given facility while the state government 
could impose an explicit emission limit, or vice-versa.  
71
 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (preempting state enforcement of emission 
standards less stringent than existing federal standards).
72
 Ann Carlson, Federalism, Preemption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 306 (2003) (“environmental regulation – in which both 
the states and the federal government play an active role – frequently raises 
preemption questions”).
73
 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).  There are exceptions to this rule.  The EPA may waive 
preemption of emission standards adopted by California, subject to certain 
conditions.  42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).  Where the EPA has approved a waiver for 
California, other states may adopt the California rule.  In all cases, however, the 
other 49 states may not adopt a “third” standard.  The Clean Air Act contains 
similar provisions governing standards for gasoline.  42 U.S.C. § 211(c)(4).
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automotive fuel economy.74 Other preemption provisions can be 
found in the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act,75
and the Toxic Substances Control Act,76 among other statutes.  In 
United States v. Locke, the Supreme Court found Washington
State’s laws governing the prevention of spills from oil tankers to 
be preempted by relevant federal laws.77  Federal environmental 
laws have also been found to preempt the federal common law of 
interstate nuisance.78
B. Inducement
Whereas the federal government has broad authority to 
preclude state regulation, its power to induce state regulation is 
more proscribed.  State sovereignty precludes the federal 
government from dictating state regulatory initiatives.  Such 
“commandeering” of legislative or executive functions violates the 
residual sovereignty of state governments and is not a “necessary 
and proper” exerc ise of federal power.79  This constitutional 
prohibition hardly leaves the federal government without 
substantial ability to prompt state regulatory efforts.  As the 
Supreme Court noted in New York v. United States, there are “a 
variety of methods, short of outright coercion, by which Congress 
may urge a State to adopt a legislative program consistent with 
74
 49 U.S.C. § 32919(a).  Unlike with emission standards, there is no conditional 
exemption for California.
75 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b).  There has been a significant amount of litigation about 
the scope of preemption under this provision, in part because FIFRA also 
contains a savings clause at 7 U.S.C. § 136v(a).  See generally Alexandra B. 
Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and Common Law Tort Claims, 7 
MINN. J. L. SCIENCE & TECH. 89 (2005).
76 15 U.S.C. § 2617.
77
 529 U.S. 89 (2000) (finding preemption under the Port and Waterways Safety 
Act of 1972).
78 See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981).  See also Robert 
Percival, The Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of 
Interstate Nuisance, 55 ALA. L. REV. 717 (2004).
79 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Adler – When Is Two A Crowd? DRAFT – Not for Citation
29
federal interests.” 80  Congress can encourage “cooperative” 
regulatory efforts by offering states financial and other resources to 
implement regulatory programs in conformity with federal 
requirements.  Where such rewards are insufficient, Congress may 
impose various penalties on noncompliant states, threatening to cut 
off funds unrelated to the regulatory program at issue or to preempt 
state regulatory programs that do not meet federal dictates.
The federal government’s power to induce state 
cooperation is on display throughout the environmental portions of 
the U.S. Code.  While current federal environmental laws grant 
expansive regulatory authority to federal agencies, most 
environmental statutes are implemented through a “cooperative 
federalism” model.81  The federal government outlines the 
contours of a given regulatory program, and states are encouraged 
to implement the program in accordance with federal regulations 
with a combination of carrots and sticks.82  The carrots include 
funding for state regulatory programs.  The sticks include the 
threat of federal preemption – specifically, if states refuse to 
regulate as the federal government demands, the federal 
government may regulate in their place – and, in some instances, 
the loss of federal funding not directly related to the 
implementation of environmental regulations.  Provided the 
relevant standards are met, states are free to tailor the details of 
80
 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
81 New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (1992) (“where Congress has the authority to 
regulate private activity under the Commerce Clause, we have recognized 
Congress' power to offer States the choice of regulating that activity according 
to federal standards or having state law pre-empted by federal regulation. . . . 
This arrangement . . . has been termed cooperative federalism.” (internal 
citations and quotations omitted)). Statutes that employ the cooperative 
federalism model include the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act, portions of the Safe Drinking Water Act, and 
the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act.  
82 See John Dwyer, The Practice of Federalism under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. 
L. REV. 1183, 1184 (1995).  See also DENISE SCHEBERLE, FEDERALISM AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY: TRUST AND THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION
(1997).
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their individual programs to accommodate local conditions and 
concerns. 83
The strongest inducements for state cooperation are 
probably found in the Clean Air Act.84  Under the CAA, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants, such as 
ozone (“smog”) and particulate matter (“soot”).  States with 
metropolitan areas that fail to attain NAAQS are required to draft 
State Implementation Plans (SIPs), including a wide-range of 
federally mandated pollution control measures, which states then 
submit to the EPA for its approval.85  Failure to submit an adequate 
SIP by the appropriate deadlines can result in the imposition of one 
or more federal sanctions, including the loss of federal highway 
funds, increased offset requirements for new development, and the 
imposition of a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) that the EPA 
will enforce.86  In addition, local transportation projects cannot 
receive federal funding unless they conform to an EPA-approved 
SIP.87
Federal inducement does not guarantee that states will 
adopt measures that satisfy federal policy makers.  It does, 
however, adjust the relative costs and benefits (economic and 
83
 Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good 
Fortune, 54 MD. L. REV. 1516, 1534 (1995) (“The essence of cooperative 
federalism is that states take primary responsibility for implementing federal 
standards, while retaining the freedom to apply their own, more stringent 
standards.”).  A notable exception is the case of product standards.  As a general 
matter, federal product standards, such as vehicle emission standards, tend to 
preempt more stringent state standards.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) 
(preemption of state automobile emission standards); 42 U.S.C. § 7545(c)(4)(A) 
(preemption of state fuel standards).
84
 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7661f.
85
 42 U.S.C. § 7410.
86
 42 U.S.C. § 7509.  It should be noted that the imposition of such sanctions is 
not solely, or even primarily, within the EPA’s discretion, as individual citizens 
and activist groups may force the EPA’s hands through citizen suits seeking to 
enforce the express requirements of the CAA and regulations promulgated 
pursuant to it. See 42 U.S.C. § 7604.
87
 42 U.S.C. § 7506.
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otherwise) of regulatory choices.  If states decide that the costs of 
following federal preferences are greater than the value of the 
incentives offered (or if the costs are greater than bearing the 
punitive sanction threatened), they may not follow federal wishes.  
Indeed, in the 1970s when the EPA claimed the authority to 
commandeer state officials directly, some government officials still 
balked.88 States retain the ability to reject federal requirements 
under the Act, yet some would argue that this combination of 
inducements virtually assures state cooperation.89
III. INDIRECT FEDERAL INFLUENCE ON STATE POLICY CHOICES
Federal policies that directly influence state regulatory 
decisions are only half of the picture.  Just as the federal action 
may encourage or discourage state regulatory action directly, 
federal action may indirectly, or even incidentally, encourage or 
discourage state regulatory action.  Federal policies will facilitate 
greater state regulation where such actions reduce the costs of state 
implementation, such as by subsidizing necessary research, or 
where federal policies increase the demand for given regulatory 
policies at the state level so as to alter or “set” state policy agendas.  
Federal policies will discourage state regulatory action where they
“signal” that state regulatory action is excessive or unnecessary or 
where they reduce the marginal benefits of adopting state 
regulatory programs – benefits either to the general welfare, those 
interest groups demanding state regulatory activity, or to the 
policymakers responsible for adopting the relevant policies.90
88 See Stewart, supra note 42, at 1204 (“State and local officials refused to 
enforce many of the [EPA]’s unpopular controls.”); see also supra note ___, and 
cases cited therein.
89
 This author has argued elsewhere that, while the CAA’s inducement scheme is 
effective, it is may be unconstitutional.  See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra
note 10, at 447-52.
90
 It should be noted that the hypotheses presented in this section are not 
dependent upon any particular theory about what sorts of interests ultimately 
drive the policymaking process.  The hypotheses are equally compatible with 
public interest and public choice theories of policy formation.
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Such “crowding out” is most likely to occur where federal 
regulations serve as a substitute for state regulations, though there 
may be other factors that have a similar effect.  Adding in these 
indirect influences – facilitation, agenda setting, signaling, and 
crowding out – produces a more complete matrix of the ways in 
which federal policies influence state regulatory choices (see 
Figure 1b below).
Figure 1b
Federal Influence on State Regulatory Activity
Direct Indirect
More State 
Regulation
(“positive”)
Commandeering
Inducement
Agenda Setting
Facilitation
Less State 
Regulation
(“negative”)
Preemption SignalingCrowding Out
A. Positive Indirect Effects
Federal regulation and other policy measures may 
indirectly encourage or facilitate state environmental regulation.  
Without offering any direct inducements, the federal government 
may encourage state policy makers to adopt environmental 
regulations that they would not otherwise enact by affecting the 
costs and benefits of state regulatory measures, or by increasing 
the demand for given policies at the state level.
1. Agenda Setting
One way in which federal action may indirectly encourage 
greater state regulation is taking actions that effect the state-level 
policy agenda.  Specifically, federal action may elevate the 
salience of particular issues to state policymakers, thereby 
increasing the demand for regulation or other policy action in a 
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given state.91 In this fashion, federal policymakers may engage in 
“agenda setting” that influences state regulatory policy choices.
Actions by all three branches can have an agenda setting 
effect.  For example, a study by an executive agency or 
congressional committee may identify a particular health concern 
may prompt local action to reduce the threat.  National debate over 
a given issue, such as whether to create or reform a new 
entitlement, may prompt states to act where the federal government 
does not.  Similarly, a judicial decision either requiring the federal 
government to act, or perhaps finding that the federal government 
lacks the power to address a given concern, may raise the profile of 
a given issue and increase the demand for action at the state level.
An area in which federal agenda setting can be observed is 
indoor air pollution.  Indoor air pollution is a serious 
environmental problem.  Indeed, by some accounts, indoor air 
pollution is greater health concern than outdoor air pollution in all 
but the most heavily polluted cities.92  Yet indoor air pollution is 
not the sort of problem particularly suited to federal regulation.  
Insofar as indoor air pollution is a function of building design and 
local conditions, and does not involve spillovers across property –
let alone jurisdictional – boundaries, it is the sort of issue that state 
and local governments should be able to address.93  State and local 
governments are in a better position to address indoor air pollution 
through building codes, real estate transaction disclosure 
requirements, workplace exposure regulations, and the like.  Thus 
it should be no surprise that there are few federal regulations 
governing indoor air.
91
 William W. Buzbee, recognizing the Regulatory Commons: A Theory of 
Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 55 (2003) (“increased activity and 
publicity about an issue can over time change stakeholder perceptions and 
possibly preferences”).
92 See GOKLANY, supra note 20, at 43 (“indoor air quality, particularly in the 
home, is a far better indicator of the impact of air pollution on public health” 
than is outdoor air quality).
93
 For a discussion of where federal intervention is, and is not, justified to 
address environmental concerns, see Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 
10, at 139-157.
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This is not to say that the federal government is inactive, 
however.  The EPA has programs to address indoor air pollution, 
but these programs are, for the most part, designed to increase 
awareness and understanding about indoor air concerns.94 The 
EPA puts out information, including scientific reports, about radon 
levels, environmental tobacco smoke, and other indoor air 
concerns.95  These reports both increase the salience of indoor air 
pollution for state and local policy makers, and therefore may 
increase the demand for state and local regulatory measures.  
When the EPA put out a study claiming secondhand smoke is a 
carcinogen, it did not prompt federal regulation.96  Yet numerous 
local governments cited this study as a basis for local ordinances 
controlling secondhand smoke.
Certain federal actions, and the lack thereof, have also 
increased the salience of climate change as an environmental 
policy concern.  Various federal agencies have sponsored research 
and published reports on the potential impact of anthropogenic 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases on climate 
change.97  Such actions, combined with the efforts of international 
94 See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, “Air – Indoor Air Quality,” 
available at http://www.epa.gov/iaq/.
95
 For example, the EPA distributes various publications, posters and other 
materials on the risks posed by secondhand smoke.  See U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Indoor Air Quality – Smokefree Homes Program,” 
available at http://www.epa.gov/smokefree/publications.html.
96 See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPIRATORY HEALTH 
EFFECTS OF PASSIVE SMOKING: LUNG CANCER AND OTHER DISORDERS (1992), 
available at http://cfpub2.epa.gov/ncea/cfm/recordisplay.cfm?deid=2835.  
While quite influential, this study has been subject to criticism and challenged in 
court.  See Flue-Cured Tobacco Coop. Stabilization Corp. v. U.S. EPA, 4 F. 
Supp.2d 435, (M.D.N.C. 1998), vacated on other grounds, 313 F.3d 852 (4th 
Cir. 2002).
97 See, e.g., NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES COMMITTEE ON THE SCIENCE OF 
CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOME KEY 
QUESTIONS (2001); U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, CLIMATE 
CHANGE IMPACTS ON THE UNITED STATES: THE POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES OF
CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE (2000).  See also U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, “Global Warming,” available at
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organizations and environmental NGOs, have increased the profile 
of “global warming.”  At the same time, the federal government 
has not adopted any regulatory policies to control emissions of 
carbon dioxide and other gases linked to climate change.  To the 
contrary, both Congress and the Executive have, at times, 
explicitly refused to adopt such measures.98
This combination of enhancing climate change’s profile on 
the public policy agenda and failing to act created an opportunity 
for states.  Over the past decade, numerous states have adopted 
measures to address climate change concerns.99  Most of these 
measures are exceedingly modest, and few involve direct 
regulatory controls, but they are more aggressive than those 
adopted by the federal government.  California, however, has 
sought to adopt prescriptive regulatory controls.  In July 2002, 
California adopted legislation requiring the California Air 
http://yosemite.epa.gov/oar/globalwarming.nsf/content/index.html; U.S. 
Department of Energy, “Climate Change,” available at
http://www.energy.gov/environment/climatechange.htm.
98
 Congress considered, and rejected, a proposal to control greenhouse gas 
emissions during the debate over the legislation that would eventually become 
the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.  During the Clinton Administration, 
several environmental organizations petitioned the EPA, claiming the agency 
was nonetheless required to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.  
At the time, the EPA declared it had the authority to adopt such regulations, yet 
it did not take any steps to do so.  Subsequently, under the Bush Administration, 
the EPA revised its legal opinion, concluding that the Clean Air Act did not 
confer regulatory jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions.  At the same time, 
the bush Administration opposed legislative proposals to regulate greenhouse 
gas emissions.  At the time of this writing, litigation efforts to force the EPA to 
regulate greenhouse gases have been unsuccessful.  See Massachusetts v. EPA, 
__ F.3d __ (D.C. Cir. 2005).
99 See TESKE, supra note 9, at 17 (noting several states adopted carbon dioxide 
standards, while others oppose ratification of the Kyoto Protocol); see also
BARRY G. RABE, GREENHOUSE AND STATEHOUSE: THE EVOLVING STATE ROLE 
IN CLIMATE CHANGE ix (2002) (“The trend is unmistakably towards more states 
taking an active role in climate change.”); Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, 
Preemption, and Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 282 
(2003)(noting many states “have quietly begun to fill the void in leadership that 
some believe exists at the national level”).
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Resources Board to “develop and adopt regulations that achieve 
the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse 
gas emissions from motor vehicles.”100  These regulations were 
subsequently finalized in 2004.  Even though the federal 
government has not sought to regulate greenhouse gases, federal 
actions have almost certainly increased the demand for climate 
policies at the state level.
2.  Facilitation
A second way that federal action may indirectly encourage 
greater state environmental regulation is by reducing the costs of 
developing or implementing environmental regulation.  Federally 
funded scientific research, data collection, and information 
disclosure requirements may reduce the fixed costs of developing, 
implementing, and enforcing state regulatory programs.
While much of the information required for effective 
environmental protection is local in nature, much of the relevant 
scientific knowledge will apply nationwide.101  The weather 
conditions and topographical features that influence ozone 
formation will vary from place-to-place, but the underlying 
chemical reactions will not.  Federal research into the relative 
effectiveness of controls on various ozone precursors can reduce 
the cost, and increase the effectiveness, of state-level air quality 
regulation.  Were each state required to conduct its own 
environmental scientific research, there could be much duplication 
and inefficiency.102  In addition, there are likely to be scale 
100
 A.B. 1493, codified in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (2003).
101 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, CONFRONTING THE NATION’S WATER 
PROBLEMS: THE ROLE OF RESEARCH 68 (2004) (a federal role “is appropriate in 
those research areas where the benefits of such research are widely dispersed 
and do not accrue only to those who fund the research”).
102 See Esty, supra note 5, at 614-15 (“Absent centralized functions, independent 
state regulators will either duplicate each other’s analytic work of engage in 
time-consuming and complex negotiations to establish an efficient division of 
technical labor.”).  Of course it is possible that “competition” could improve 
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economies in the resources and technical expertise required for 
some forms of scientific research that reinforces the potential for 
federal efforts to facilitate state-level regulation.
Federal information reporting requirements may also 
facilitate state regulatory measures.  Under the federal Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI), for example, industrial firms are required 
to collect and release information about the amount of toxic 
“releases” from each facility.  The resulting reports provide 
voluminous information on the nature and extent of industrial 
chemical use and disposal, and provide figures that serve as a 
proxy for the extent of industrial pollution.  This information 
undoubtedly serves to increase the demand for regulation of “toxic 
releases.”  At the same time, requiring the collection and 
publication of this information may reduce the costs of adopting 
supplemental state regulatory measures.  By requiring the creation, 
collection, and dissemination of extensive data about industrial 
facilities, federal law may be providing state policymakers with 
some of the information necessary to craft state-level responses to 
the same concerns.   Moreover, insofar as state policymakers can 
rely upon industry reports required under federal law, this may 
reduce the monitoring costs to ensure compliance with related state 
rules.  Even modest federal actions may facilitate significant state-
level interventions.
B. Negative Indirect Effects
Just as federal action may indirectly encourage greater state 
regulatory activity, federal action may discourage state regulatory 
action.  This can occur in at least two ways.  First, the adoption of 
a federal regulatory standard may “signal” that more stringent state 
regulations are unnecessary.  In effect, the federal standard may be 
seen as evidence that a given level of regulatory protection is 
sufficient to safeguard relevant public interests, and more stringent 
scientific research insofar as different entities pursue different research 
methodologies to address emerging environmental problems.  
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measures are unnecessary.  As a result, the adoption of federal 
regulation may induce state policymakers to lower comparable 
state protections.  In addition, the adoption of a federal regulation 
may “crowd out” state regulatory measures by reducing the net 
benefits provided by additional state measures.  As a result, the 
existence of federal regulation may discourage the adoption of 
additional state-level regulatory protections in the future.    
The potential for federal regulatory measures to reduce the 
level of state regulatory activity is significant because it challenges 
the prevailing assumption that the adoption of a federal regulatory 
standard raises, or at least maintains, the aggregate level of 
protection nationwide.103 Many environmental analysts, for 
example, suggest that the federal government should adopt a 
regulatory “floor,” but allow states to implement federal standards 
and adopt more stringent measures of their own.  The general 
belief is that this will maximize the extent of environmental 
protection.104 Yet if the adoption of federal regulatory standard 
can induce states to adopt less protective environmental measures 
than they would otherwise have adopted, the net benefits of a 
federal floor will be less than traditionally assumed, as in some 
states it will result in a net reduction in the aggregate level of 
environmental protection.  Indeed, it is possible that the net result, 
over time, of a federal regulatory floor could be the maintenance of 
lower levels of environmental protection than would otherwise 
have been adopted.  Even if such effects are unlikely, federal 
policymakers should consider these possibilities when assessing 
the likely costs and benefits of federal action.
103
 Where federal regulation is preemptive, it may also provide a “ceiling” as 
well.
104 See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Roman, & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition 
as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL L.J. 1, 7 
(2005) (noting the notion of federal policy as a ‘floor’ protecting certain 
‘fundamental values’ still has vitality” in environmental policy debates). It is 
also assumed that more environmental regulation is more optimal than less 
regulation.  Yet, as a theoretical matter, over-regulation can be just as welfare-
reducing as under-regulation.  See infra ___.
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1.  Signaling
Just as federal attention to a given environmental concern 
may increase the demand for state-level action, the adoption of a 
given federal standard may send a signal that discourages the 
adoption or maintenance of more protective state regulations.  
Specifically, the adoption of a given regulatory standard by a 
federal agency sends a “signal” that the relevant standard is 
worthwhile.105  Among other reasons for this effect is that federal 
policymakers, particularly federal agencies, are presumed to have 
substantial technical expertise.  Thus, their actions may convince 
state policy makers (or their constituents) that additional 
safeguards are “unnecessary” or that the benefits of more stringent 
regulatory protections are not worth their costs.  The magnitude of 
this effect is likely to correspond with the magnitude of the 
difference between the relevant federal and state standards. In this 
way, federal standards can discourage state policymakers from 
adopting and maintaining more stringent measures of their own, 
even where such measures could be justified.  As a practical 
matter, the federal “floor” may become a “ceiling” as well.  
This effect is not merely hypothetical.  There are numerous 
examples of state legislation designed to prevent state 
environmental agencies from adopting regulatory standards that 
are more stringent than federal rules.106  Between 1987-1995, 
105 See McNollgast (Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. 
Weingast), Legislative Intent: The Use of Positive Political Theory in Statutory 
Interpretation, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 25 (1994) (noting “an action is 
informative if it is taken by an informed person who pays a fee, expends effort, 
or gorefoes some valuable alternative activity in order to take the action”).  On 
signaling generally, see JEFFREY S. BANKS, SIGNALING GAMES IN POLITICAL 
SCIENCE (1991).
106 See Jerome M. Organ, Limitations on State Agency Authority to Adopt 
Environmental Standards More Stringent than Federal Standards: Policy 
Considerations and Interpretive Problems, 54 MD. L. REV. 1373, 1376-86  
(1995); see also Arnold W. Rietze, Jr., Federalism and the Inspection and 
Maintenance Program under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. L.J. 1461, 1465 (1996) 
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nearly 20 states adopted at least one statute limiting the ability of 
state agencies to adopt regulatory controls more stringent than 
relevant federal standards.107 Some states focus on a given 
environmental concern, while others have general prohibitions 
against the adoption of any environmental rules more stringent 
than applicable federal standards.108  New Mexico and Colorado, 
for example, have statutes prohibiting the promulgation of air 
pollution controls more stringent than required by federal law.109
Virginia law bars state regulatory authorities from requiring greater 
amounts of water treatment than mandated under the federal Clean 
Water Act.110  Others state have general prohibitions against 
agency promulgation of environmental rules more stringent than 
federal law.111
The existence of statutes barring state regulatory agencies 
from adopting more stringent regulations may be evidence of a 
greater hostility to environmental protection in some state 
legislatures than in Washington, D.C. Yet such laws may also be a 
rational response to the signal created by the adoption of a federal 
standard at a given level, particularly insofar as state policymakers 
conclude that their federal counterparts have greater expertise 
about and understanding of relevant environmental concerns.  
Information is costly, and the knowledge and expertise necessary 
to determine whether a given level of protection may tax the 
resources of state governments.  Therefore, deferring to federal 
policy judgments by responding to the signal of a federal standard 
may enable state policymakers to economize on information and 
policy development costs.112
(noting “movement among state legislature to prohibit more stringent state 
standards”).
107 Organ, supra note 106, at 1376 n.13.
108 Id. at 1377.
109 See N.M. STATE. ANN. § 74-2-5 (Michie 2000); COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-7-
114.2 (2004).
110 See VA CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Michie 2001).
111 See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12A.120 (2003).
112 See Organ, supra note 106, at 1390.
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On the other hand, the localized nature of much 
environmental knowledge and expertise could suggest that 
signaling may systematically encourage less optimal state-level 
regulations to the extent federal standards fail to take local needs 
and variation into account.113  Some state laws may address this 
concern, however, as they allow state agencies to adopt more 
protective measures where local conditions warrant.114
There are several reasons why this signaling effect may be 
of concern.  First, and perhaps most important, the existence of a 
signaling effect that reduces the level of state regulations below 
what they would otherwise will reduce the net benefits provided by 
federal regulations, as illustrated in Figure 2.  When the federal 
government adopts a federal regulatory standard, this will increase 
the level of regulation in those states that have lower levels of 
regulation.  It will also lower the level of regulation in any state 
that adopts laws barring the promulgation of regulations more 
stringent than the federal standard.
113 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
114 See Organ, supra note 106, at 1380 (noting some states bar “an agency from 
promulgating standards or regulations more stringent than federal law unless 
unique circumstances justify more stringent reuglaitons”).
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Figure 2
A B C
QFReg
The net effect of such signaling is represented in Figure 2 
above.  States A and B have regulatory standards (QAReg and QBReg, 
respectively) less stringent than the federal standard (QFReg).  State 
C, on the other hand, has a regulatory standard (QCReg) greater than 
the relevant federal standard.  Adoption of the federal regulatory 
standard increases the aggregate level of regulation by a quantity 
equal to the sum of the difference between the federal standard and 
the lower state standards ((QFReg - QAReg ) + (QFReg - QBReg)).  The 
net effect of the federal standard may be lower than this, however.  
If State C adopts a law prohibiting state standards that exceed 
relevant federal requirements, the aggregate level of regulation will 
be reduced by the amount to which State C’s standard exceeded 
the federal standard (QCReg - QFReg).  Thus, the net effect of the 
federal standard will be the extent to which the increase in 
regulation in States A and B exceeds the reduction in State C 
((QFReg - QAReg ) + (QFReg - QBReg) - (QCReg - QFReg).  In the unlikely 
event that the reduction in regulation in State C exceeds the 
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increase in regulation in States A and B, the adoption of a federal 
standard could actually result in a net reduction in the aggregate 
level of regulation.  
There are other reasons to be concerned about a signaling 
effect.  Insofar as federal standards are not based upon accurate, 
up-to-date scientific assessments of environmental problems,115
and such information is not available to state and local 
policymakers, the federal regulation may have an even greater 
distorting effect on state priorities.  Such laws may also serve to 
shift effective control over environmental priorities from the state 
to federal level.116  Of course, to the extent federal policymakers 
are likely to adopt quantitatively or qualitatively superior 
regulatory standards, the signaling effect may have a positive 
effect on regulatory policy.  There could be additional welfare 
benefits from a signaling effect to the extent it reduces regulatory 
variability across states.117
The importance of signaling is not that it necessarily results 
in less optimal regulation.  Rather, the primary importance of the 
signaling effect is that it is likely to reduce the net benefits 
provided by the adoption of a federal regulatory standard.  Taking 
this indirect effect of federal regulation on state regulatory choices 
into account is likely to improve the quality of environmental 
policymaking.
2.  Crowding Out
A second potential negative indirect effect of federal 
regulation on state regulatory choices is “crowding out.”  This 
occurs because federal regulation may serve as a substitute for 
state-level regulation, and thereby reduce the benefits of adopting 
or maintaining state-level protections.  Insofar as voters in a given 
115 See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at ___ (noting inadequate 
understanding of environmental problems covered by various federal programs).
116 See Organ, supra note 106, at 1387.
117 See Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch, supra note 10, at ___ (noting potential 
benefits from economies of scale generated by regulatory uniformity).
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state demand a certain level of environmental protection, there is 
no reason to expect states to duplicate federal efforts insofar as a 
federal program is satisfying that demand, particularly if a state has 
not already created such a program.  If the federal “floor” is greater 
than or equal to the level of environmental protection demanded by 
a state’s residents, there is no reason for a state to adopt 
environmental regulations of its own once the federal government 
has acted.  Insofar as this effect occurs, it is separate from –
perhaps even in addition to – the signaling effect described above.
The claim here is not simply that states regulate less than 
they would absent federal regulation – although this claim is 
almost certainly true.  Rather, the claim here is that there may be 
some states that, absent the imposition of federal regulations, 
would adopt regulations more protective than the federal floor, but 
due to federal regulation, have not done so, and may not do so in 
the future either.  If this hypothesis is correct, then it is possible 
that, at least in some states, the net effect of federal environmental 
regulations could be less environmental protection than would 
have been adopted had the federal government not intervened.
To see how this could occur, consider first that the demand 
for environmental regulation in any given jurisdiction will tend to 
increase over time as wealth, technical capability, scientific 
knowledge, and environmental impacts increase.118  In any given 
state (as in the nation as a whole), there is an initial period (“Period 
A”) during which the demand for a given type of environmental 
protection is relatively low.  The costs of adopting environmental 
regulations in this period are greater than the benefits to be derived 
from adopting any such protections.  These costs include the costs 
of developing, drafting, and passing legislation, the costs of 
creating a new policy program, drafting and implementing 
regulations, defending the regulations from any potential legal or 
administrative challenges, creating a means to monitor and enforce 
regulatory compliance, and so on, in addition to the opportunity 
118 See infra Part I.A.
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costs of devoting state resources and political capital to the cause 
of environmental protection as opposed to some other policy goal.  
As discussed earlier, the demand for environmental 
protection has tended to increase over time along with increases in 
living standards.119  At the same time, increases in technical 
knowledge and administrative efficiency may also lower the costs 
of a given regulatory program.  Eventually, a state will enter a 
second period (“Period B”) in which the benefits of a given 
environmental regulatory program are greater than the costs of 
initiating, implementing and operating such a program.  Absent 
any federal interference, the hypothetical state will not adopt 
environmental regulations in Period A, but will adopt such 
regulations in Period B.  (See Figure 3)  This is the environmental 
transition discussed in Part I.  In Period A, the demand for 
environmental protection is insufficient to justify the costs of 
implementing environmental protection measures.  By Period B, 
however, the demand for environmental protection has risen due to 
increases in wealth and knowledge, among other factors.  At the 
same time, increases in technical capacity and scientific 
understanding have reduced the cost of adopting environmental 
protections.  As a result, in Period B a state will adopt QB amount 
of environmental protection.120
119 See infra Part I.A.
120
 Environmental protections can be evaluated in both quantitative and 
qualitative terms.  This initial discussion focuses exclusively on the quantity of 
environmental protection.  The effect of qualitative differences in environmental 
protection are discussed below.  See infra Part IV.
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Figure 3
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The timing of Period A and Period B will vary from state to 
state.  This is clearly the case as different states have adopted 
different environmental regulatory measures at different times –
some before the adoption of federal environmental regulation, 
some after, and some not at all. Looking at the history of various 
environmental concerns, such as air quality, water quality, or 
wetlands, it is clear that many states moved from Period A to 
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Period B for these environmental concerns at various times prior to 
the onset of federal regulations in the 1970s.  In many other states, 
however, a federal regulatory floor was adopted before the onset of 
Period B. 
For states that went through their environmental transition, 
prior to the enactment of federal environmental protection, whether 
the adoption of a federal regulatory floor increased the aggregate 
level of environmental protection in that state depended upon 
whether pre-existing state policies offered greater or lesser levels 
of protection than the relevant federal rules.  For states in which 
the onset of Period B begins after the adoption of federal 
regulations, the enactment of a federal regulatory floor will, at the 
time of enactment, increase the aggregate level of environmental 
protection in that state.  But this may not be the case over time.  In 
states that develop desire a greater level of protection than that 
provided by the relevant federal regulations, it is not clear that the 
existence of the federal regulatory floor will result in an equal or 
greater level of protection than would be adopted were it not for 
the federal regulations.  This is because federal regulation will, to 
some extent, act as a substitute for state regulation.  As a result, the 
adoption of federal regulation has the potential to reduce the 
demand for state regulation and, in some instances, even result in 
less aggregate regulation in a given state than would have been 
adopted absent federal intervention.  In short, federal regulation 
can crowd out state regulation.
 The potential for such a crowding out effect is illustrated 
in Figure 4.  The existence of federal regulation will reduce the 
demand for state regulation by an amount equal to the extent to 
which federal regulation is a substitute for state regulation of the 
same environmental concern (QFReg).  This substitution effect will 
reduce the net benefit of adopting state-level environmental 
regulations from OCQB to OC’Q’B.  By reducing the net benefits 
of state-level environmental regulation in this manner, federal 
regulation has the potential to crowd out state-level environmental 
protections, even if the quantity of environmental protection 
demanded in the state is greater than that provided by the federal 
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government.  In such cases, the aggregate level of environmental 
protection will be lower with federal regulation than it would be 
without it.
Figure 4
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A key assumption in this analysis is that there are 
significant fixed costs to the adoption of environmental protections 
(or, for that matter, any regulatory program).  In some states, the 
additional benefits of adopting more stringent regulations on top of 
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the federal requirements will more than offset the costs of adopting 
the new program.  In these states the fixed costs of creating a 
program plus the operating costs are less than the expected 
marginal benefits from the additional margins of regulation.  
However, it seems likely that there are at least some states in 
which the aggregate net benefits of regulation at a level more 
protective than the federal standard are greater than the costs of 
such regulation absent federal regulation, but that the net benefits 
of additional regulation above and beyond the federal floor are less 
than the costs of adopting such additional regulations.  In other 
words, if in a given state the net benefits of adopting state 
regulations alone (OCQB) are greater than the costs of adopting 
such regulations (CReg), but the net benefits of adopting such 
regulations given federal regulations are already in place (OC’Q’B) 
are less than CReg, then the presence of a federal regulatory floor 
will produce a lower level of environmental protection than were 
that floor not to exist.121
In this latter situation, one would not expect the state to 
regulate, even though the amount of regulation demanded in the 
given state is greater than that provided by the federal government.  
While federal regulation creates a floor, raising the regulatory 
baseline, it does not reduce the fixed costs of policy change.  (If 
anything, it may increase the opportunity costs for state 
policymakers who devote their political capital to the 
environmental resource at issue rather than another environmental 
concern in which the federal government is not active.)  Federal 
regulation does, however, reduce the benefits of state regulation, 
and may do so significantly.
This theory is based on several premises and observations 
about the political economy of policymaking.  First, environmental 
regulation, like most forms of regulation or other government 
action, experience diminishing marginal benefits and increasing 
marginal costs.  That is, the marginal environmental gains from 
121
 Put in formulaic terms, for states in which OCQB > CReg but CReg > 
OC’Q’B , the presence of a federal regulatory floor will result in a lower level of 
environmental protection.
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each additional increment of regulation will tend to be less than the 
gains from the preceding increment.  Thus, when the federal 
government establishes a floor, it has likely displaced those state 
efforts that would be most cost-beneficial.  (This has the effect of 
shifting the demand curve for state regulation to the left, reducing 
the net benefits of state regulation.)
Second, the political process imposes substantial 
transaction costs on the creation of (or elimination of) new 
government programs, and these costs are relatively fixed such that 
they do not vary with the size of the program in question.  The 
most obvious example of such transaction costs is the existence of 
so-called “vetogates” that determined minority interests can use to 
prevent the adoption of policies that enjoy majority support.122
The existence of these “vetogates”123 means that many policy 
changes must have supermajority support before they are enacted –
or at the very least require the expenditure of substantial amounts 
of political capital by their proponents (as a means of purchasing 
supermajority support).124  The fragmentation of policy-making 
authority across branches of government adds to the difficulty of 
adopting new policies.  The obstacles also may be particularly 
large in highly complex policy areas like environmental 
protection.125
122 See McNollgast, supra note 105, at 11 (observing that because “attempts to 
pass new legislation typically must navigate through numerous veto gates . . . it 
is difficult and time-consuming to change most prior legislative bargains.”).
123
 William Eskridge defines a “vetogate” as “a place within a process where a 
statutory proposal can be vetoed or effectively killed.” William N. Eskridge Jr., 
Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Construction, 66 U. CHI. L. REV.
671, 677n13 (1999).
124
 McNollgast, supra note 105, at 16 (noting “the basic structure of government 
establishes several checks on the ability of legislative majorities to enact their 
will”).
125 LAZARUS, supra note 65, at 32 (noting the “strong structural bias within our 
existing lawmaking institutions in favor of government’s acting more slowly and 
incrementally”).  While Lazarus comments are directed at the national 
government, this same structural bias can be seen in state governments as well.
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Third, policymakers are, to some extent, utility maximizers 
such that, all else equal, they will invest in policies that provide the 
greatest benefits and lowest costs to them.126 Insofar as state 
policymakers “share” responsibility for some environmental 
concerns with their federal counterparts, it may be difficult for 
them to secure the benefits of their efforts.127 Relatedly, 
information about the relative activities of the federal and state 
governments and their relative merits is costly to the average voter 
where both the state and federal governments are active, so it may 
be difficult for policymakers to get credit for all of the policies 
they promote or implement.128  This is one reason why some argue
that cooperative federalism undermines accountability.  When both 
126
 The utility maximized by the policymaker need not be the policymaker’s 
“self-interest” but could also be the “public interest” that the policymaker seeks 
to serve.  See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins, 
The Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. 
ENVTL. L. REV. 313, 333 (1998) (observing legislator may derive utility from 
many different interests).  Alternate assumptions do not alter the analysis.  
Indeed, as Jonathan Macey observes, 
over a wide range of issues, the outcomes predicted by the public-
interest model will be identical to those predicted by the interest-group 
model when the political-support-maximizing solution varies widely 
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
Jonathan R. Macey, Federal Deference to Local Regulators ad the Economic 
Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 
VA. L. REV. 265, 284 (1990).  See also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle, & 
Andrew Dorchak, Coosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 
214-223 (2005) (summarizing various theories of regulation); Daniel A. Farber, 
Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 62-70 
(1981) (same)
127 See Buzbee, supra note 91, at 27 -28 (noting policymakers may view 
“regulatory opportunity as a commons resource much as fishers would view a 
shared ocean,” resulting in regulatory inattention).
128 See Macey, supra note 126, at 275 (noting division of authority between 
federal and state governments can enable Congress to “shift the blame for 
controversial enactments even more effectively . . . than by deferring to 
administrative agencies”); Buzbee, supra note 91, at 31 (“Where numerous 
regulators could be blamed for the ill, or sought out for relief, demanders of 
regulation encounter substantial informational and strategic hurdles confounding 
attribution decisions”).
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the federal government and the states are involved, it is more 
difficult for a voter to know who to credit or blame for a given 
policy.129  Because it is easier for a state policy maker to get credit 
for a policy when the state does not compete with the federal 
government in the provision of that policy goal, all else equal a 
state policy maker will prefer to legislate where the federal 
government is less active.
One implication of the crowding out effect is that it is 
possible that the adoption of a federal regulatory floor may result 
in lower levels of regulatory protection than had the federal 
government not entered the field.  This potential is illustrated in 
Figure 5 below.  As in Figure 2, which illustrated the signaling 
effect, States A and B initially have regulatory standards (QAReg
and QBReg, respectively) less stringent than the federal standard 
(QFReg), while State C has a regulatory standard (QCReg) greater 
than the relevant federal standard.  Here, however, the demand for 
environmental regulation in each state is not static.  Rather, the 
demand for regulation in State B is increasing over time.  Absent 
federal regulation, State B would eventually adopt a higher level of 
protection – a level of protection greater than that which would be 
adopted at the federal level.  In this scenario, the adoption of a 
federal standard not only has the potential to signal to states to 
reduce their levels of protection.  It may also discourage the 
adoption of ever greater levels of protection in those states that go 
through their environmental transition after the adoption of the 
federal standard.  This potential opportunity cost of federal 
regulation is no less important than the more observable effects 
illustrated in Figure 2.
129 See Michael S. Greve, Against Cooperative Federalism, 70 MISS. L. REV.
557 (2000); see also Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of 
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual 
Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813, 828 (1998) (noting 
“accountability” argument for anti-commandeering rule, insofar as it is 
accepted, applies with equal force to “cooperative federalism” arrangements).
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Figure 5
A B C
QFReg
When the crowding out effect is combined with the 
signaling effect discussed above, the likelihood that federal 
regulation could result in a net decline in the aggregate level of 
regulatory protection increases.  As before, adoption of the federal 
regulatory standard increases the aggregate level of regulation by 
quantity equal to the sum of the difference between the federal 
standard and the lower state standards.  The net benefits of the 
federal standard at any given point in time is this amount (QFReg -
QAReg ), less any reduction due to signaling (QCReg - QFReg), and the 
extent to which State B would have regulated absent federal action 
(QBReg - QFReg).  Here the net effect of the federal standard will be 
the extent to which the increase in regulation in State A varies 
from the reduction in State C and regulation foregone in State B.  
Stated as a forumla: (QFReg - QAReg ) – [(QBReg - QFReg)  + (QCReg -
QFReg)].  
Even if the adoption of federal regulation initially increased 
the aggregate level of regulatory protection, over time the level of 
Adler – When Is Two A Crowd? DRAFT – Not for Citation
54
protection may be less than they would otherwise have been. Over 
time, as more states go through their environmental transitions, the 
magnitude of this crowding effect could increase, unless federal 
regulatory standards are able to keep pace.  Given the slow rate at 
which existing federal regulatory programs are reviewed and 
expanded, however, this would seem to be a questionable 
assumption.  
IV. QUALITATIVE VS. QUANTITATIVE PROTECTION
Up until this point, this paper has discussed environmental 
protection in a two-dimensional fashion, focusing on quantitative
changes in regulatory protection.  This vastly over simplifies the 
relevant analysis, as various regulatory programs will vary in both 
quantitative and qualitative terms.130  Two programs that appear to 
adopt the same quantitative level of environmental protection, such 
as the same ambient standard or emission limit, and yet vary quite 
significantly in cost, effectiveness, equitableness, and other factors.
Conversely, two programs that adopt superficially disparate goals 
may, in fact, offer qualitatively similar environmental protection.  
For these reasons, any complete analysis must acknowledge that 
environmental measures vary in both qualitative and quantitative 
ways.
There are several factors that may cause state-level 
environmental regulations to be more cost-effective, or otherwise 
qualitatively superior, than federal regulations of equivalent cost or 
scope.131  First, and perhaps most important, state policymakers 
and regulators may have access to knowledge of local problems 
130 See Nathaniel O. Keohane, Richard L. Revesz, and Robert N. Stavins, The 
Choice of Regulatory Instruments in Environmental Policy, 22 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 313, 313 (1998) (noting design of environmental policy requires 
determining both the desired level of environmental protection and what policy 
instruments should be used to achieve the specific environmental goal).
131 See generally TESKE, supra note 9, at 23 (summarizing potential advantages 
of state regulation).
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and conditions.132  Consideration of such knowledge in the 
development and implementation of state regulatory programs may 
increase the protectiveness of existing programs without increasing 
their cost or scope.  Second, and related, state policymakers, by 
virtue of the fact that they are closer both to the environmental 
problems they seek to address and the regulated community may 
be more responsive to local needs and concerns.  Third, insofar as 
environmental problems vary from place to place, state 
policymakers may be able to focus state resources on 
environmental problems that exist in a given state.  Federal 
standards, on the other hand, tend to impose broad one-size-fits-all 
requirements that, in actuality, often fit no state particularly 
well.133  A regulatory requirement that makes perfect sense in one 
state may not provide much environmental protection in another.  
Fourth, the existence of a federal standard may inhibit the ability of 
(or incentive for) state policymakers to innovate or experiment 
with different approaches to meeting a given environmental 
goal.134
There is empirical evidence that, at least in some areas, 
state regulation may do a better job of addressing local 
environmental concerns in a cost-effective manner.  Several states 
clean up abandoned hazardous waste sites at lower cost and more 
rapidly than the federal Superfund program.135  Similarly, federal 
132 See infra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
133 See Dwyer, supra note 4, at 222 (“The sheer size of the nation and the 
dizzying variety of social and environmental conditions and political preferences 
leave little hope that the central government could efficiently or accurately 
custom tailor environmental laws for different regions.”).
134
 On state innovation generally, see ALEXANDER VOLOKH, ET AL., NAT’L 
ENVTL. POLICY INST. & REASON PUB. POLICY INST., RACE TO THE TOP: THE 
INNOVATIVE FACE OF STATE ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT (1998); see also 
Richard L. Revsez, Federalism and Environmental Policy: A Public Choice 
Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 53, 636 (2001) (“[T]he states, not the federal 
government, produced the most innovation in pollution contorl legislation in the 
1990s.”).
135 See Richard L. Revsez, Federalism and Environmental Policy: A Public 
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 53, 603 (2001) (noting state leadership in 
waste site clean up and brownfield redevelopment).
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regulations may hinder the adoption of more effective pollution 
control or resource conservation strategies, and that state 
policymakers would be more sensitive to such concerns.  The 
federal Clean Air Act requires many states to adopt suboptimal 
pollution control strategies when equally stringent – but differently 
targeted – measures would produce greater results.136  In the 
wetlands context, states took the lead in evaluating wetland 
functions and incorporating the ecological value of particular 
wetlands into the regulatory process when there was no evidence 
similar considerations entered the federal permitting process.137  In 
other words, at a given level of stringency, some states were 
beginning to incorporate ecological consideration so as to 
maximize the environmental value of regulations on wetland 
development when the federal government was doing no such 
thing.  
States need not regulate “more” than the federal 
government to provide greater levels of environmental protection.  
Better regulation – that is environmental protection measures that 
are qualitatively different – may be sufficient in some instances to 
improve the level of environmental protection.  Insofar as federal 
regulation encourages states to adopt a particular approach to 
environmental protection, or discourages states from adopting 
programs more suited to specific state conditions, it can reduce 
aggregate environmental protection.  Just as the federal 
136 See Adler, Judicial Federalism, supra note 10, at 462-63.
137
 For instance, as of 1992 ten states were using wetland classification systems 
to evaluate function and value in the regulatory process. William E. Taylor & 
Dennis Magee, Should All Wetlands Be Subject to the Same Regulation? 7 NAT. 
RESOURCES & ENV'T. 32, 34 (1992). The development of these sorts of 
programs is important because "[a]bsent regulatory classification, there is a 
presumption that all wetlands are of equal significance with respect to functional 
value, and that no distinctions are necessary in the level of regulation or in 
designating mitigation requirements." Id. at 32.  On the other hand, a review of
Corps permitting decisions found no evidence such considerations entered into 
the regulatory process.  See Michael J. Mortimer, Irregular Regulation Under 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act: Is the Congress or the Army Corps of 
Engineers to Blame? 13 J. ENV. L. & LITIG.  445 (1998).
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government’s regulatory programs discourage more extensive state 
regulatory efforts, these programs may also discourage the 
adoption of qualitatively preferable state level programs that may 
differ more in kind than in their degree of stringency.
Much of the discussion has also operated under the 
assumption that a greater quantity or stringency of regulation is 
necessarily more optimal.  While this assumption is common in the 
environmental literature, it is also an over-simplification.  Over-
regulation, in the form of excessively stringent or overly-enforced 
regulatory requirements, is just as possible as under-regulation.  
The most welfare enhancing regulatory regime is that which comes 
closest to the optimal level of environmental regulation, not 
necessarily that which produces the greatest level or regulation.
V. CASE STUDY: WETLANDS
The “cooperative federalism” model implemented in most 
federal environmental programs complicates the observation of 
indirect effects due to the existence of inducement measures to 
encourage state regulation. Wetlands regulation may be one 
context in which the indirect effects of federal regulation on state 
policy choices may be observed, however, and perhaps even 
empirically tested.  Under Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, the 
federal government regulates the filling and modification of 
wetlands directly.  States receive little inducement to regulate in 
the federal government’s stead.138 Wetland regulation is one area 
in which the state regulatory choices are largely free from direct
federal influence.139  For this reason, it may be easier to isolate and 
assess the extent to which non-preemptive federal regulation is 
having the sorts of indirect effects on state regulatory decision-
138
 Only two states, Michigan and New Jersey, have delegated authority to 
administer wetlands regulations in lieu of the federal government.
139
 The primary exception is federal funding for state coastal zone management 
programs which may include regulations of coastal wetlands.
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making discussed in Part III in the context of wetland regulation 
than in other areas.  
Several states began to regulate the modification of 
wetlands well before the federal government.  Massachusetts 
became the first state to enact wetland regulations in 1963 with the 
adoption of a statute requiring a state-issued permit for the 
dredging or filling of coastal wetlands.140  This statute was based 
upon preexisting zoning requirements adopted by local 
governments in several coastal states.141  Two years later the 
Massachusetts legislature extended the statute to cover inland 
wetlands as well.  Other states shortly followed suit, including 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia and Washington.142  By 1975, 
when federal regulation of wetlands began, every coastal state in 
the lower 48 states save Texas had adopted wetland regulations of 
some kind.143
Congress enacted the CWA, formally known as the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act, in 1972.  The CWA prohibits the 
“discharge of any pollutant,” including rock, sand, or dredged 
material, into “navigable waters” of the United States without a 
federal permit.144  “Navigable waters” are defined as “waters of the 
United States,”145 which has been interpreted to include all 
navigable and nonnavigable waters, their tributaries, and wetlands 
the use of which could impact interstate commerce.146  Section 404 
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to issue permits “for the 
discharge of dredged or fill material into the navigable waters,” 
140 Alexandra D. Dawson, Massachusetts' Experience in Regulating Wetlands, in 
ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, WETLAND PROTECTION: 
STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE STATES 255 (1985).  
141 Id.
142
 This history is recounted in Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the 
Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Limits of 
Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENV. L. 1, 47-54 (1999).
143 JON A. KUSLER ET AL., STATE WETLAND REGULATIONS: STATUS OF 
PROGRAMS AND EMERGING TRENDS 1 (1994).
144
 33 U.S.C. §1311(a).
145
 33 U.S.C. §1362(7).
146
 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a).
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subject to a veto by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA).147
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers did not initially 
interpret the CWA to require Section 404 permits for the filling of 
wetlands.148  Environmental groups disagreed with this 
interpretation and sued the Army Corps in federal court.149  The 
United States District Court for the District of Columbia rejected 
the Corps’ interpretation of the Act, holding that Congress, in 
passing the CWA, “asserted federal jurisdiction over the nation's 
waters to the maximum extent permissible under the Commerce 
Clause of the Constitution,” including wetlands and other non-
navigable waters.150  While there seemed to be a substantial 
amount of state regulatory activity prior to the onset of federal 
wetland regulation, after the federal government began regulating 
wetlands in 1975, the rate at which non-regulating states adopted 
new wetland regulations appears to have slowed.  States that had 
yet to adopt wetland protections by 1975 had yet to go through 
their environmental transition with regard to wetlands, it is 
possible that at least some of these states went through their 
transition some time after 1975, however.  Were it not for the 
adoption of federal regulation, these states may have adopted 
wetland regulations in the intervening years.  Such legislation 
could well have been discouraged or delayed – or “crowded out”” 
– due to the presence of federal regulations.
Of note, all fourteen states in the continental U.S. with 
more than ten percent of their land area in wetlands according to 
the National Wetland Inventory adopted wetland protection 
measures prior to 1975.151  As one review of state wetland 
147
 33 U.S.C. §1344(a), (c).
148 See 531 U.S. at 168 (citing Corps’ 1974 regulation).
149
 The Environmental Protection Agency also disagreed with the Army Corps’ 
initial statutory interpretation. 
150
 NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975).
151 See JON A. KUSLER, ET AL., ASSOCIATION OF STATE WETLAND MANAGERS, 
STATE WETLAND REGULATION: STATUTE OF PROGRAMS AND TRENDS, at 5-8, 
tbl. 1.  The states in question are Alabama, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Adler – When Is Two A Crowd? DRAFT – Not for Citation
60
regulations noted, “most of the states with the largest wetland 
acreages have adopted wetland regulatory efforts for all or a 
portion of their wetlands.”152  Although the adoption of such 
measures can entail significant costs, the states with the most 
wetlands clearly determined that the value of protecting wetlands 
was greater than the attendant costs of regulating them, interstate 
competitive pressures notwithstanding.  This pattern is the exact 
opposite of what some scholars had predicted.153  It is also 
significant that those states that regulated before the federal 
government tend to have more extensive regulatory protections 
than do those states that acted later.
A potential explanation for this history of state wetland 
regulation is that those states with the most wetlands were, by and 
large, the first states to go through the environmental transition 
with regard to wetlands.  Under this hypothesis, states with a large 
percentage of their land area in wetlands were the first to recognize 
the tremendous ecological and economic benefits that wetlands can 
provide, including flood control, water filtration, species habitat, 
and the like.  As these states went through the environmental 
transition, the demand for wetland protection increased until the 
benefits of adopting such measures was greater than the costs.  The 
presence of federal regulation, however, reduced the value of state 
wetland regulations to the extent that federal regulation served as a 
substitute for state regulation.  Because of the fixed costs involved 
with the adoption of a new wetland regulatory program, the net 
effect would be greater than just the substitution effect, so that 
states that went through the environmental transition with regard to 
wetlands after 1975 may not have adopted wetland regulations of 
their own, even if the state regulations would have been more 
protective than the federal rules.  Where states did subsequently 
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New 
Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Wisconsin.
152 Id. at 3.
153 See Oliver A. Houck & Michael Rolland, Federalism in Wetlands 
Regulation: A Consideration of Delegation of Clean Water Act Section 404 and 
Related Programs to the States, 54 MD. L. REV. 1242, 1253 (1995)..
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adopt wetland regulations, due to the crowding out effect the 
regulations may have been adopted significantly later than they 
would have absent the federal rules.
The history of wetland regulations may also provide 
evidence of how federal policy-making may encourage the 
adoption of environmental policies at the state level.  While 
Massachusetts and some other states recognized the value of 
protecting their wetland resources before the federal government 
did, many other states adopted their first regulatory measures after 
the importance of wetland protection was recognized at the federal 
level.
Federal consideration and eventual passage of the Coastal 
Zone Management Act (CZMA)154 may have influenced state 
policymakers as well, particularly in coastal states.  A national 
discussion on the importance of protecting coastal resources could 
have increased the salience of coastal zone protection at the state 
level.  The protection of wetlands is one of the specific policy 
goals explicitly referenced in the act.155  Passage of the CZMA 
may have further encouraged state-level protection of coastal 
wetlands insofar as the CZMA authorizes federal funding of state 
coastal zone programs.  
Contemporary developments in wetland protection at the 
federal and state level may provide further insight into the effect 
federal regulatory decisions have on state environmental policies.  
In 2001, in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC),156 the Supreme Court 
narrowed the scope of the Clean Water Act (CWA).  Specifically, 
the Court held that the CWA does not confer federal regulatory 
jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters, including isolated 
wetlands.157  Initial reactions to the SWANCC holding predicted 
154
 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465.
155
 16 U.S.C. § 1452(2)(A).
156
 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
157
 531 U.S. at 173.
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substantial negative effects on wetland protection efforts 
nationwide.158
While the initial response to the SWANCC decision as 
alarm, the actual effect of the decision became was muddied rather 
quickly.159  A Joint Memorandum issued by the Army Corps and 
EPA in January 2003 prohibited the assertion of regulatory 
jurisdiction over isolated waters based upon the presence of 
migratory birds alone, but did not provide much additional 
guidance.160  At the same time, the two agencies proposed to 
clarify the scope of regulatory jurisdiction under the CWA through 
a rulemaking.161  This effort was soon abandoned due to extensive 
criticism from environmentalist organizations.162  In the meantime, 
158 See, e.g., Lance D. Wood, Do Not Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to 
All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their 
Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187, 10189, 10195 (2004)  (noting 
“potentially disastrous” and “catastrophic” effects).  Writing n dissent, Justice 
Stevens also predicted dire consequences from the Court’s decision to 
“needlessly weaken[] our principal safeguard against toxic water.”  531 U.S., at 
__ (Stevens, J., dissenting).
159 See, e.g., Lance D. Wood, Do Not Be Misled: CWA Jurisdiction Extends to 
All Non-Navigable Tributaries of the Traditional Navigable Waters and to Their 
Adjacent Wetlands, 34 ENVTL. L. REP. 10187, 10189, 10189 (2004)  (noting 
SWANCC was “ambiguous” and courts have been “inconsistent” in their 
interpretations); Amended Statement of Patrick Parenteau, Professor of Law, 
Vermont Law School, before the House of Representatives Committee on 
Government Reform, Sept. 19, 2002 (“The decision has created substantial 
uncertainty regarding the geographic jurisdiction of the Clean Water Act.”); 
Position Paper on Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Determinations Pursuant to the 
Supreme Court’s January 9, 2001 Decision, Solid Waste Agency of Northern 
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Associate of State Wetland 
Managers, Dec. 2001 (“The section 404 regulatory program has been in turmoil 
ever since the Supreme Court’s SWANCC decision.”).
160 Id. at 1995, Appendix A.
161
 Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on the Clean Water Act Regulatory 
Definition of “Waters of the United States,” 68 Fed. Reg. 1991 (Jan. 15, 2003).
162 See Eric Pianin, EPA Scraps Changes To Clean Water Act; Plans Would 
Have Reduced Protection, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 2003, at A20.  One reason 
given by the Army Corps and EPA to forego the rule-making was that federal 
courts had narrowly interpreted SWANCC’s impact.  Ironically, on the same day 
as the Army Corps/EPA announcement, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
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federal implementation of the holding has been inconsistent.163  A 
study by the General Accounting Office found that Army Corps 
district offices’ jurisdictional determinations have varied 
significantly since SWANCC.164  In the courts, there is already a 
circuit split on the scope of the holding.165  Most circuits have 
adopted a fairly narrow reading of SWANCC, though the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has interpreted SWANCC to 
impose potentially significant limits on federal regulatory authority 
under the CWA.166
As state policy makers are more likely to adopt new 
environmental measures where the net benefits from such actions 
are greatest – and they are most likely to receive credit for their 
efforts – the modest interpretation of SWANCC, as well as the 
continued uncertainty as to the scope of post-SWANCC federal 
regulatory authority, would discourage additional state action.167
The benefits of additional state regulation, and the extent to which 
Circuit held that such narrow interpretations of SWANCC were “unsustainable.”  
See Daniel Simmons, Navigating SWANCC: An Examination of the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers’ Authority Under the Clean Water Act, 43 ENVTL. L. REP. 
10723, 10730 (2004) (citing In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 2003).
163 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, Waters and Wetlands: Corps of 
Engineers Needs to Evaluate Its District Office Practices in Determining 
Jurisdiction, GAO-04-297, Feb. 2004, at 3 (“Corps districts differ in how they 
interpret and apply the federal regulations when determining what wetlands and 
other waters fall within the jurisdiction of the federal government”).
164 Id. at 3 (“Corps districts differ in how they interpret and apply the federal 
regulations when determining what wetlands and other waters fall within the 
jurisdiction of the federal government”).
165
 At the time of this writing, there is a circuit split as to the extent of federal 
jurisdiction under the CWA post-SWANCC.  See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 
332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (interpreting SWANCC narrowly); United States v. 
Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 
335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)(same); compare In re Needham, 354 F.3d 340 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (after SWANCC federal jurisdiction only extends to wetlands adjacent 
to navigable waters); Rice v. Harken Exploration Co., 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 
2001) (same).  
166 See Needham, 354 F.3d; Rice, 250 F.3d.
167 See Buzbee, supra note 91, at 14 (noting “uncertain regulatory turf creates 
both demand and supply-side incentives for regulatory inattention”).
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state policy makers will be able to take credit for protecting 
isolated waters is uncertain, so the value of such measures will be 
discounted accordingly.  It is also possible that the reluctance of 
states to adopt additional wetland protections reflects nothing more 
than a lack of demand for such protections in those states that have 
yet to adopt measures covering isolated wetlands. Nonetheless, 
shortly after SWANCC, many states considered, and some adopted, 
additional regulatory measures to fill the gaps potentially left by 
the decision.168 Insofar as the Supreme Court resolves any 
lingering ambiguity about the scope of federal jurisdiction after 
SWANCC in currently pending cases, it will be important to see 
how states respond. 
The history of wetlands regulation is far from conclusive.  
While it provides evidence that federal actions can both directly 
and indirectly encourage the adoption of state-level environmental 
measures, it does not prove that federal regulations crowded out 
state wetland protections.  One can only surmise the details of such 
a counterfactual scenario.169 The pattern of wetland regulation is 
nonetheless consistent with the crowding out theory.  This 
narrative suggests the need for empirical examination into the 
168
 According to Professor Michael Gerhardt:
at least 19 states have responded to the decision by either enacting or 
recommending the enactment of laws to fill the void left by the Court’s 
decision.  These states include, inter alia, California, Connecticut, 
Illinois, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin.  These reactions are a clear illustration of 
environmental federalism in action.  
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Curious Flight of the Migratory Bird Rule, 31 ENVTL. 
L. REP. 11079, 11085 (2001).  The state of Ohio, for example, enacted an 
“emergency measure” to extend state regulations to isolated wetlands in July 
2001, only a few months after the SWANCC decision. 2001 Ohio H.B. 231.  See 
also, C. Victor Pyle III, Isolated Wetlands Jurisprudence Post-SWANCC and 
Resulting Federal and State Attempts to Fill the Void, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL 
L.J. 91, 101-106 (2002) (summarizing initial state-level responses); Jan 
Goldman-Carter, Isolated Wetland Legislation: Running the Rapids at the State 
Capitol, NATL WETLANDS NEWSLETTER, May-June 2005, at 27 (same).
169 See generally, Robert N. Strassfeld, If . . .: Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 339 (1992).
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determinants of state wetland regulation that seeks to account for, 
and measure, the extent to which any crowding effect can be 
observed.
CONCLUSION
Both the federal and state governments have an integral 
role to play in environmental protection.  If each is to play an 
optimal role, however, there must be greater consideration of how 
the various levels of government interact.  In particular, there must 
be greater consideration of how federal regulatory decisions may 
enhance or undermine complementary efforts at the state level.  
Even where federal regulation is absolutely necessary, it 
establishing the optimal level of environmental protection requires 
consideration of how such regulations will effect state-level policy 
making.  In some cases, the adoption of a federal regulatory floor 
will enhance state efforts.  In other cases, it will not.  Indeed, in 
some instances, increased federal environmental efforts may 
produce less environmental protection.  This finding is important 
because it challenges the prevailing yet heretofore unexamined 
assumption that the adoption of federal regulatory floors ensures a 
maintenance or increase in levels of environmental protection from 
that which would be observed absent federal involvement.  The 
precise extent of federal influence on state regulatory policy 
requires further empirical examination. In the meantime, greater 
attention to these influences could further facilitate the 
development of more effective and protective environmental 
measures.
